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Agencies' Obligation to Interpret the
Statute
Aaron Saiger*
Conventionally, when a statute delegates authority to an agency, courts
defer to agency interpretations of that statute. Most agencies and scholars view
such deference as a grant of permission to the agcncy to adopt any reasonablc
interpretation. That is wrong, jurisprudentially and ethically. An agency that
commands deference bears a duty to adopt what it believes to be the best
interpretation of the relevant statute. Deference assigns to the agency, rather
than to a court, power authoritatively to declare what the law is. That power
carries with it a duty to give the statute the best reading the agency can.
Notwithstanding substantial jurisprudential disagreement about what
it means to give a statute its "best interpretation," an agency does not abide its
role when it seehs to achieve anything less. An agency is legally and ethically
obligated to privilege what it views as optimal statutory interpretation over
what it considers to be optimal policy. If the two conflict, as they sometimes will,
the agency must act consistently with the former to the detriment of the latter.
To behave otherwise is to fail to adhere to principles of legislative supremacy
and fidelity to law.
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INTRODUCTION: STATING THE QUESTION
Very often, a statute that confers power upon an agency permits
multiple interpretations, each reasonable but mutually irreconcilable.
How should an agency select among them? In the view of most agency
officials and scholars, an agency is entitled, ethically and
jurisprudentially, to pick whichever interpretation best advances its
policy preferences, subject only to the constraint that its selection
should survive judicial review.1 This view is as wrong as it is ubiquitous.
In circumstances where a reviewing court is expected to defer to agency
interpretation, the agency bears a legal and ethical duty to select the
best interpretation of its governing statute. This is a concomitant of the
agency's duty, independent of the courts, to uphold the law. Best, this
Article contends, means "best by the agency's own criteria." But those
must be interpretive criteria. 2
This sharply distinguishes an agency that receives judicial
deference from a court that extends it. Deference sometimes requires a
court not to impose what it views as the best interpretation of a statute.
The deferential judge sometimes must ratify and enforce statutory
1. See infra Part II.A.
2. See infra Parts I.D-E.
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interpretations with which she disagrees. 3 Such deference is especially,
though not exclusively,4 associated with the paradigmatic case of
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.5 Absent "an
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress," Chevron instructs, 6 a
reviewing court should enforce any "permissible construction" that an
agency assigns to its statute. 7 The court should not impose the
construction that it thinks is best. 8
A responsible agency must do the opposite. It must reject
interpretations that it concludes are interpretively suboptimal,
notwithstanding that an ethical, law-abiding reviewing court would
acquiesce in those interpretations. This follows directly from the
concept of judicial deference itself. A deferential court, by abstaining
from finally deciding what a statute means, assigns its law-declaration
function to the agency. As Professor Henry Monaghan wrote (before
Chevron), deference doctrine is the Marbury v. Madison of agencies. 9 In
3. Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5
(1983). This is the standaid bense of the word "deference." The primary exception is "deference" as
used in connection with Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944). So-called "Skidmore deference" is
not deference in the sense of the term used here. See infra Part III.B.
4. This Article treats Chevron as the paradigmatic deference doctrine, but its argument
encompasses any deference rule that instructs courts to uphold or enforce an agency interpretation
other than the one that it would adopt absent any agency interpretation. At the federal level, this
would include, for example, foreign-affairs deference under United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936), and deference to agencic' interpretations of their own rules under
Auar v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). For an overview of the range of federal deference regimes,
see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1097-
1136 (2008). At the ctato level, one finds a range of deference arrangements, come as deferential
as Chevron and others less so. See Aaron J. Saiger, Chevron and Deference in State Administrative
Law, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 555, 557-60 (2014). The argument in this Article also extends to
proposals to extend or alter the scope of Chevron or other deference regimes. See, e.g., William N.
Eskridge Jr., Expanding Chevron's Domain: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Relative
Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 411, 446-48.
5. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
6. Id. at 843. This caveat is the famous "Chevron step one." The concept of the deference
space suggested by Professor Strauss, described immediately infra, collapses this requirement into
the general rubric of deference: in cases where Congress unambiguously expresses its intent, the
set of permissible interpretations is a singleton, a set with only one member. Peter L. Strauss,
"Deference" Is Too Confusing-Let's Call Them 'Chevron Space" and 'Skidmore Weight," 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145, 1159 (2012).
7. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
8. Monaghan, supra note 3, at 5; Cass Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power to
Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2588 (2006).
9. Monaghan, supra note 3, at 25.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the mine run of cases, courts "say what the law is."1° When such cases
involve statutory interpretation, judicial interpretation is
authoritative. But cases where a court defers to an agency's statutory
interpretation are the exception. By extending deference, a court
renders it the "province and the duty" of the agency "to say what the law
is." An agency subject to deference is doing what the court would
otherwise do.
When a court defers, therefore, the agency's duties parallel those
of the judge in a case where no deference is offered. An agency obliged
to say what the law is must do so to the best of its ability." Such an
agency takes on what would have been the judicial duty to use available
interpretive tools to reach the best account it can of what a statute
means. An agency, like a judge, has no business assigning a second-best
interpretation to a statute in order to achieve a preferred policy in the
knowledge that, as a matter of institutional structure, it has the last
word. That institutional structure, the assignment of interpretive
finality to a particular decisionmaker, is justifiable only in light of the
expectation that the final interpreter will interpret faithfully.
Even as deference doctrine is the source of the agency's duty to
interpret, however, in American administrative law deference has
obscured both the importance and the existence of that duty. This is
true both in the literature and in agency practice. In large part, this is
because courts, not agencies, decide which interpretations of a statute
rate deference and which do not. In Professor Peter Strauss's useful
conceptualization, courts retain the power to set boundaries: they
decide what a given statute "must mean and what it cannot mean, ' 12
and defer only to agency interpretations that fall within the "space"
between the two.1 3 Especially because the power to define a deference
space includes the ability to collapse it to a singleton-to declare that a
statute has only one permissible interpretation-judicial boundary-
setting has come widely to be identified with deference itself. The
enormous and enthusiastic literature that surrounds Chevron and
other deference doctrines undertakes to understand, justify, and
10. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
11. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARv. L. REV. 2118, 2120,
2144 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014), and arguing that judges
should "determine the 'best reading' of a statutory text," and depart from it only if doing so is
justified by substantive canons of interpretation).
12. Strauss, supra note 6, at 1145, 1159.
13. Id.; accord Monaghan, supra note 3, at 5; Sunstein, supra note 8, at 2588.
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taxonomize judicial boundary-setting, and to analyze when and under
what conditions courts are expansive or niggardly in defining those
boundaries.
The bright light that shines upon how courts limn deference
spaces has largely eclipsed questions of how agencies operate within
such spaces. Only recently, as administrative-law scholarship has
begun generally to turn towards intra-agency deliberation, has a
literature begun to develop on how agencies should interpret statutes. 14
This literature explores the argument that practices of statutory
interpretation are properly influenced by institutional role.15 Several
scholars have argued that an agency selecting among permissible
interpretations should be particularly attentive to statutory purpose,
even if, in the same case, a reviewing court might or even should
determine the boundaries of the deference space with much greater
attention to issues raised by the text.16 In particular, Professor Kevin
Stack has developed the important claim that regulatory statutes are
"purposive by statutory design," and that agencies carrying them out
therefore "have a statutory obligation to interpret their statutes in a
purposive manner." 17  Textualist interpretation in the courts,
14. See, e.g., Eskridge, oupra note 4; Jerry L, Maohaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of
Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADM1N. L. REV. 501, 503
(2005) ("[A]dministrative interpretation [is] a legal practice in its own right."); Trevor W. Morrison,
Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (2006)
("Statutory interpretation in not the oluoivo province of courts; it is a core function of the
executive branch as well."); Kcvin M. Stack, Purposivism in thc Executivc Branch: How Agencies
Interpret Statutes, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 871 (2015); Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the
Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative
History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 335 n.36 (1990). The positive analogue to these pieces is
Professor Christopher Walker's recent important survey of agencies. Christopher J. Walker, Inside
Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1062 (2015). Walker assesses agencies'
familiarity with the canons of statutory construction and their openness to the use of legislative
history in statutory interpretation not only to aid the Congress and the courts in developing
enpoctations regarding how agencies will work with statutes, but also as a way to shed light upon
the interpretive fidelity of agencies as they construe legislation. See id.
15. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 4; Stack, supra note 14, at 875 & nn.7-10 (reviewing
literature). This claim is an aspect of what Professors Nestor Davidson and Ethan Leib have
usefully dubbed "regleprudence": law adoption and law interpretation in agencies both is and
ought to be a particular endeavor with particular rules and standards. See Nestor M. Davidson &
Ethan J. Leib, Regleprudence-at OIRA and Beyond, 103 GEO. L.J. 259, 264 (2015) (arguing for a
category distinct from jurisprudence and legisprudence that addresses the development and
interpretation of regulations).
16. See ROBERTA. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 27-28 (2014); Michael Herz, Purposivism
and Institutional Competence in Statutory Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 89, 94-106;
Stack, supra note 14; Strauss, supra note 14.
17. Stack, supra note 14, at 876, 878.
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concomitantly, need not and should not displace purposivist
interpretation in the agencies.
Even that literature, however, elides the prior question of what
ethical self-understanding an agency should have when it selects an
interpretation from within a non-singleton deference space. That
understanding is independent of, and prior to, statutory design; ethics
precede the particulars of any organic statute. An agency identifies
multiple interpretations of its governing statute all of which are
reasonable and consistent with the statute, and all of which therefore
should survive judicial review. Should an agency therefore be free to
adopt any interpretation in the deference space of an ambiguous statute
in order to advance policies it prefers? Or must a conscientious and
ethical agency reject interpretations that it concludes are permissible
but interpretively suboptimal, notwithstanding that an ethical, law-
abiding reviewing court will accept such interpretations?
On this question, the literature is silent and the cases confusing.
Chevron in particular offers support to both positions. On the one hand,
it repeatedly characterizes an agency choosing within a deference space
as "interpreting" or "construing" the statute, thus engaging in the same
task as courts would when considering an ambiguous statute de novo.18
At the same time, Chevron states that an agency that reasonably
construes an ambiguous statute is entitled to deference if it makes a
"reasonable policy choice." 19 The administrative action reviewed in
Chevron itself was a reading assigned by the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency to the ambiguous word "source" in
the Clean Air Act.20 In a famous passage, the Chevron Court concludes
that reading was "entitled to deference" because "the Administrator's
interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly
competing interests," and his "decision involve [d] reconciling conflicting
policies."21
In many cases, both approaches lead to the same result. But not
always. When they do not, only the first position, that agencies must
interpret the law as best they can, is consistent with their role as
authoritative and final declarants of what the law is. Deference doctrine
should be understood to give interpretive power to agencies faced with
18. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 843 & n.9 (1984).
19. Id. at 845; accord id. at 865 (noting that the agency receiving deference is "reconciling
conflicting policics" and "rcly[ing] upon the incumbcnt administration's view of wise policy to
inform its judgments").
20. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1683.
21. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 859.
[Vol. 69:5:12311236
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legislative ambiguity. It does not say that ambiguity authorizes
agencies to chase any policy agenda they can reasonably square with
the statute.
Agency practices in this area cannot be easily policed; indeed,
because the nature of agency action makes them difficult even to
observe. But this makes it all the more important to be clear about what
duties agencies bear when they decide how to read a statute. As with so
many other ethical decisions, often only the agency will know if it is
doing the right thing.22 But, also like other such decisions, this makes
it only more important that attention be given to what the right thing
is.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the question of
interpretive ethics under deference. In particular, it explores the key
distinction between interpretation and policymaking, which creates the
possibility that an agency can think one interpretation of a statute is
"better" while still "preferring" a different, reasonable interpretation.
Part II presents three possible understandings of the agency duty to
interpret under deference, and argues that agencies expecting
deference should hew to what they understand to be the best
interpretation of the statute. Part III discusses variations in
circumstances that might affect the propriety of this course of conduct.
Dean Roscoe Pound defined "discretion" as "an authority
conferred by law to act in certain conditions or situations in accordance
with an official's or an official agency's own considered judgment and
conscience." 23 He rounds out his definition by noting that discretion "is
an idea of morals, belonging to the twilight zone between law and
morals."24 Pound was speaking of judicial discretion, but agencies
anticipating judicial deference are the assignees of that discretion;
Pound's definition thus applies to them with full force. If multiple
interpretations of a statute are all reasonable but irreconcilable, it is a
matter of "considered judgment" to decide between them. It is also a
matter of "morals." This Article is about those "morals." Legislative
supremacy and fidelity to the statute, rather than good policy, should
be an agency's "moral" lodestar.
22. Cf. Strauss, supra note 14, at 321, 335 n.36 (noting the lack of "candor" and "camouflage"
associated the ability of an agency to "dres[s] her conclusion up in the language of [legislative]
history and what its materials command" in order to justify a pure policy preference).
23. Roccoo Pound, Discretion, Dispencation and Mlitigation: The Problem of the Individual
Special Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 926 (1960).
24. Id.
2016] 1237
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
1. CLARIFYING THE QUESTION
This Article asks: May agencies subject to deferential judicial
review adopt any interpretation that they reasonably expect to survive
such review, or are they obligated to adopt the best interpretation? In
this Part, I discuss why I have framed this question as I have. The
discussion also foreshadows key aspects of the answer I propose.
A. Defining "Agency"for the Purpose of Statutory Interpretation
A preliminary but important point is that when this Article
argues that agencies have a duty to interpret statutes, this duty
obligates individuals, not iostitutionis or e iities.
In ordinary speech, even among government people and lawyers,
an agency is not a person. It is an organization, one more or less
complex, with a corporate identity distinct from that of the individuals
in its employ. However, there is an important second sense in which an
agency is the person who leads it. The Administrative Procedure Act
defines "agency" as "an authority of the Government of the United
States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another
agency. '25 The "authority" to bind the government does not reside in the
organization in the abstract. Rather, it is exercised by the agency
head.26 In the line agencies, this is a single individual: think Cabinet
secretary, or the EPA administrator. In the independent regulatory
boards, authority is exercised jointly by a small group of commissioners,
few in number and voting by majority rule.
That the agency is an organization, in the first sense, is no less
important for being obvious. Courts, scholars, government officials, and
lawyers are forgivably loose when they use the word "agency" in its
25. 5 U.S.C. § 551(a) (2012).
26. The APA's identification of the "agency" with its head is explicit in its provisions for
formal agency action. At a formal hearing, the APA offers three disjunctive possibilities regarding
who may preside at the "taking of evidonco": "the agency '; "one or more members of the body which
comprises the agoney"; or an administrative law judge. 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (2012). Similarly, the
general rule that agency personnel involved in adjudicating cases may not communicate with an
agency "employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting function"
does not apply "to the agency or a member or mombors of the body comprising the agency." 5 U.S.C.
§ 554(d) (2012); Diana Gillis, Closing an Administrative Loophole: Ethics for the Administrative
Judiciary, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 863, 869 (2009); see also 1 CHARLEs H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD
MURPHY, ADMIN. L. & PRAc. § 4:42 (3d ed. 2015) ("The head of the agency is generally the final
rulemaking authority.').
[Vol. 69:5:12311238
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corporate meaning, notwithstanding the APA. 27 Such usage often
makes sense with respect to the ethics of agencies' work as well: one can
think profitably about the ethical duties of agencies in their corporate
as well as their individual identities. 28
But organizational ethics and obligations are not my concern
here. This Article uses "agency" in its strict APA meaning: to identify
the agency head, the person with authority to bind the government. In
this Article, an "agency" is the person who decides (or voting members
of the board that decides) final agency actions. (I do return briefly infra
to the question of the ethical duties of individuals who are subordinates
of agencies. 29)
B. The Interpretive Duties of Agencies
An agency bears two broad categories of "ethical" obligation. One
is that government officials must advance public rather than private
interests when at work. This is the category that comes most easily to
mind when one thinks about "government ethics." Various rules and
standards seek both to ensure public-regarding behavior and to protect
public confidence that official behavior is public-regarding. Therefore,
for example, we have rules concerning conflicts of interest: how to
prevent them, how to balance the costs and benefits of regulating them,
and how their various and mutating forms can be defined and
operationalized. 30
27. See, e.g., Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120
YALE L.J. 1032, 1035 (2011) (analyzing "how administrative law allocates power within agencies
and how arguments from expertise, legalism, and politics apply inside agencies rather than across
institutions"); Matthew C. Stephenson, Statutory Interpretation by Agencies, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 285, 320 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph
O'Connell edc., 2010) ("From the perspective of the agency considered as a whole, and of individual
agency officialB, one of the benefits of investing in learning more about the connection between
policy choices and outcomes is the ability to achieve more desirable outcomes.").
28. That this Article does not address how to design organizations to ensure and optimize
their ethical performance is not to derogate the complexity and vitality of such undertakings.
Indeed, ouch efforts have pride of place in administrative law, in the form of APA rules that require
agencies to separate their adjudicative and prosoutorial functions with a stringency beyond that
required by due process. See Alan B. Morrison, Administrative Agencies Are Just Like Legislatures
and Courts-Except When They're Not, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 79, 103, 105 (2007).
29. See infra Part III.C.
30. John D. Feerick, Ethics, Lawyers, and the Public Sector: A Historical Overview, in
ETHICAL STANDARDS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 1, 3-12 (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 2d ed. 2008).
2016] 1239
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When it comes to the fear of self-dealing, we generally restrict
problematic conflicts of interest to financial ones. 31 Because of concern
over private gain, we regulate (by disclosure, limitation, or prohibition)
things as diverse as gifts, stock ownership, and outside employment by
government employees. We likewise restrict campaign contributions
and insist upon disclosure of certain kinds of government action, such
as the awarding of contracts, in large part (though not entirely) to
interfere with efforts to achieve private gain through public means. But
conflicts of interest that are "ethnic, cultural, emotional, nostalgic,
regional ... or philosophical" are generally not considered to be the
kinds of conflict that give rise to ethical problems.3 2 Indeed, in many
circumstances these kinds of commitments properly drive the conduct
of public officials. 33 Legislators' voting decisions are a paradigmatic
example.
This Article does not address the potential for agencies to seek
private gain or the ways in which regulation can reduce that potential.
Rather, it is concerned with a second category of government ethics-
namely obligations that actors, whom we can assume are entirely
public-oriented, have in connection with the execution of their public
duties.34 These are obligations based upon role. They attach to agency
heads by virtue of their particular roles in government, not as persons
or attorneys. Avoiding self-dealing does not exhaust the ethical duties
of an agency official. Rather, to use Professor Jerry Mashaw's terms,
"internal ethics ... both motivate and restrain [agency] behavior."35
And Mashaw argues explicitly that ethical statutory interpretation is
part of that internal ethics. Agencies' interpretive processes, he says,
are surely subject to some kind of "internal normative direction." 36
Mashaw is right, especially when agencies exercise discretion.
Interpretive discretion should be cabined by professional and ethical
31. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 202-09 (2012) (criminal prohibitions).
32. NAVL MUN. LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE
LAW (1979), quoted in Feerick, supra note 30, at 7-8.
33. W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, 77 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1333, 1337 (2009).
34. Cf. Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 203 (2004) (considering the arguably intermediate case of agencies who act to
advance the self-interest of the agency qua institution, but not tho perconal celf intoreost of tho
agency qua agency head).
35. Jerry L. Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms: Agency Statutory Interpretation as an
Autonomous Enterprise, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 497, 497 (2005).
36. Id. at 499.
1240 [Vol. 69:5:1231
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constraints, which limit the influence of "ethnic, cultural, emotional,
nostalgic, regional... or philosophical" factors.37
Professor Mashaw does not distinguish between "ethics" and
"internal normative direction." But that distinction has bite when
discretionary interpretation is at issue. The normative literature on
agency statutory interpretation clusters around the proposition that
agencies should take congressional purpose into account when
interpreting statutes, and use legislative history materials to do so. 38
Such claims appear to flow primarily from the normative debate, still
raging, over the relative legitimacy of textualism and purposivism as
modes of statutory interpretation in general. 39 The primary context for
that debate is statutory interpretation by judges. But, given today's
burgeoning appreciation for statutory interpretation outside the courts,
agency interpretation seems a potentially enlightening addition to the
mix.40 For some, the claim that agencies are and should be pirposivists
and legislative historians is a way of arguing that purposivism and
historicism are legitimate and superior methods of statutory
interpretation in general, including interpretation by judges. Other
treatments of the issue advance the more modest claim that regardless
whether purposivism is legitimate or superior to textualism in general,
it is surely both legitimate and superior as an approach to
interpretation by agencies. 41
37. NAT'L MUN. LEAGUE, supra note 32, quoted in Feerick, supra note 30, at 7-8.
38. See Eskridge, supra note 4, at 421, 424, 427; Herz, supra note 16, at 94, 121; Mashaw,
supra note 14, at 513; Stack, supra note 14, at 887; Strauss, supra note 14, at 329-32. This
iter.ture nlqn ha q pnrifivo nnqlngiie, wbphre the q9rtion is thst gencip dtn in fq t prefer to
interpret purposively and rely upon legislative hiotory. Professor Chriotophcr Walker's important
survey data suggests that this i3 so with rcspect to lcgislativc history. Walker, supra note 14, at
1038. Many scholars ijiake the same clain based uoin imoe infuufial wvidene, often tvumbiting iL
with normative arguments. See Mashaw, oupra note 14, at 529 30 (taking a convenience sample
of rules that refer to "statutory interpretation," and finding more textualism than expected and
fewer than expected references to legislative history, though the latter are present); Stack, supra
note 14, at 896-99; Strauss, supra note 14, at 329.
39. Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117,
119 (2009); Glen Staszewski, The Dumbing Down of Statutory Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 209,
224 (2015) (noting "interpretive wars over the past thirty years").
40. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV.
885, 886 (2003).
41. Id. at 889 ("Compared to courts, agencies are likely to have a good sense of whether a
departure from formalism will coriouoly damage a rogulatory schomo; hence it is appropriate to
allow agencies a higher degree of interpretive flexibility."); Strauss, supra note 14, at 322 ("The
burden of this paper ic that the uco of legislativo hictory may have an importance in the agency
context for maintaining law against politics, however one regards its use at the judicial level.").
2016] 1241
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Either way, these are claims that, in the hands of agencies,
interpretations that result from a purposivist framework or rely upon
legislative history are better, in some sense, than they would be had a
textual framework been used or legislative history been eschewed.
Those who make this claim do differ over exactly what it means to be
better. I consider the substance of these differences infra Part I.D. Here,
I distinguish between the subject of these important debates, which
concern what is the best "internal normative frame" for agency
interpretation, and claims about agencies' "internal ethics." The ethical
frame enriches the discussion by adding an important, somewhat
different, and underappreciated dimension of what it might mean for
an interpretation to be "better." The ethical frame asks what is required
of a person for us to say that he is doing his duty in his job-not that he
is doing his job as well as he might, or that he is going about it as
sensibly as he should, but merely he has not been derelict in discharging
his responsibilities.
Thinking about what is "good" or "better" interpretation as an
ethical matter can be both less and more demanding of agencies than
general normative claims. It seems wrong to say, if there is a debate
between well-meaning and well-informed jurists about the relative
desirability of purposivism and textualism as techniques of
interpretation, that an agency is ethically obliged to pick one or the
other. One can believe that a particular jurist is normatively wrong to
prefer one method to the other without thinking that either is unethical
in her role. The ethical frame is therefore more agnostic as to
interpretive method than the broader, normative frame.42 On the other
hand, the ethical frame is more demanding than the normative frame
because the ethical frame addresses what agencies ought or must do.
An agency that fails to adhere to ethical principles is not doing a proper,
professional job.
To be sure, normative arguments often shade into arguments
about public ethics. Mashaw, unsurprisingly, offers the clearest
example. As he tentatively explores normative agency statutory
interpretation, he asks what confers "administrative legitimacy";43 he
asks "what norms a responsible administrator should observe when
42. But see Richard Elkins, Interpretive Choice in Statutory Interpretation, 59 AM. J. JURIS.
1 (2014) (describing but rejecting strong arguments against the claim that there is a single proper
interpretive methodology).
43. Mashaw, supra note 14, at 503.
1242 [Vol. 69:5:1231
AGENCIES' OBLIGATION TO INTERPRET
engaging in statutory interpretation";44 he emphasizes the notion of
agency as "faithful agent. '45 These concerns, about what constitutes the
best account of agencies' role within the "the whole of the legal
topography,"46 can be read as normative or specifically ethical. Mashaw
either does not see a bright distinction or does not make it clear.
Other scholars are much more explicit in being interested in the
ethical or "moral" dimension of agencies' work; but this work tends not
to focus specifically upon statutory interpretation. Professors Ethan
Leib and Stephen Galoob contrast the views of Professor Adrian
Vermeule, who takes a consequentialist, cost-benefit approach to
agency action, and Professor Evan Criddle, who argues says that
administrative agencies are "public fiduciaries," or "stewards for the
people."47 Criddle is arguing within an ethical frame in the sense I
propose here. His argument is about agencies' fiduciary duty.
"Fiduciary relations stand or fall on the fiduciary's commitment to
abandon self-interest and promote her beneficiary's welfare instead of
her own."48 Criddle wants agencies to see themselves, like other
fiduciaries, "to view their role as a call to service";49 to "manifest
altruism (or, at very least, honesty)";50 "to abandon self-interest and
promote her beneficiary's welfare instead of her own";51 and to embrace
a "solemn responsibility" to live up to "the extralegal aspirational norms
that shape fiduciary behavior."52 One might object to Criddle's fiduciary
theory, or to his identification of the principals in agencies' fiduciary
relationships (he includes statutory beneficiaries, for example, as well
44. Id.
45. Id. at 505.
46. Id. at 509.
47. See Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique, 125 YALE
L.J. 1820, 1855-58 (2016) (comparing Adrian Vernieule, Rationally Arbitrary Decisions (in
Administrative Law), 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 475, 482-83 (2015) (developing an instrumentalist theory
of administrative governance), with Evan J. Criddle, Fidulciary Faundation.s of Admini trative
Law, 5 4 UCLA L. REV. 117, 135 36 (2006) (defending a fiduciary political theory of international
law)).
48. Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117,
128 (2006).
49. Id. at 133-34.
50. Id. at 128.
51. Id. (quoting Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV 1735, 1783 (2001)).
52. Id. at 133-34.
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as the government and the society as a whole);53 but he is clearly
engaged in ethical analysis.
Professor Geoffrey Miller's early and exemplary analysis of the
ethical duties of agency lawyers takes the same approach. Agency
lawyers are a category distinct from agencies themselves, but Miller
insists that agency work is constrained by ethics. The ethical frame
applies both to the claim that Miller rejects-that agency lawyers owe
a duty to some "transcendental 'public interest' "-and the one he
advances-that "an agency attorney acts unethically when she
substitutes her individual moral judgment for that of a political process
which is generally accepted as legitimate. '54 Professor W. Bradley
Wendel makes the same sort of move with respect to government
lawyers in general (rather than agency lawyering in particular).
Wendel argues that the primary "theory of government lawyers' ethics
should be the obligation of fidelity to law enacted by tolerably fair
procedures." 55 His averral that this is a "thin conception of the
legitimacy of law," relative to the claims generated by "republican,
deliberative, or dialogic notions of law-creation," elegantly restates the
distinction I have offered between the normative and ethical frames in
this area.56
Finally, there is an unusually well-developed subject in role-
determined legal ethics that is closely analogous to agency statutory
interpretation. It regards the species of government lawyer that
exercises the most unconstrained discretion: prosecutors. Discretion is
a primary category in the literature on prosecutorial ethics.57 Moreover,
many of prosecutors' most consequential decisions, especially those that
occur outside of the trial context, 58 are effectively immune from
53. See id. at 121, 138-39, 151.
54. Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 1293, 1294 (1987); see also Note, Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of
Federal Agency Lawyers, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1170, 1173-78 (2002) (contrasting an "agency loyalty"
and "public interest" approach to agency lawyers' ethics); infra Part III.D (discussing lawyers'
ethics in the context of agency statutory interpretation).
55. Wendel, supra note 33, at 1337.
56. Id. at 1338.
57. See, e.g., Peter Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful
Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 420 25; Ellen S.
Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discretionary Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1511, 1513-15 (1999); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 1521, 1523-24 (1981).
58. It is common and reasonable to distinguish ethical obligations prosecutors bear with
rcopcct to their conduct at trial, a proccc governed by ethical rules applicablc to all lawyers, and
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review. 59 The ethical obligations of the prosecutor in such contexts
therefore bear an important family resemblance to those of an agency.60
It is easy to say that neither prosecutor nor agency should act in a way
that is private-regarding; but the interesting ethical questions are
about which ways of being public-regarding are appropriate. Both
prosecutor and agency, by design, will often feel pulled between various
ways of being public-regarding when they act on behalf of the public to
make a decision that is likely unreviewable. The question is whether
and to what extent some of those pulls are more legitimate than others.
As Professor Bruce Green puts it, prosecutors' ethics are governed not
just by relevant rules. Rather, the profession must establish "the most
desirable ways to exercise 'prosecutorial discretion,' when ... an
exercise of discretion [is] unfair or unwise, and when the prosecutor
engage [s] in an 'abuse of discretion' (albeit, one that may not be subject
to any sanction or remedy)." 61
The ethical rules governing prosecutors answer this question in
ways both large and small. Prosecutors, for example, are supposed to be
nonpartisan. 62 This rule may prevent self-dealing, but its primary
purpose is to forbid public-regarding pressures that might interfere
with impartiality or the appearance of impartiality. Similarly,
prosecutors have an enhanced duty to act with candor at trial.6 3 Most
broadly, prosecutors are required always to "seek justice" in their
official roles.64 This directive prioritizes one sort of public-regarding
function, ensuring justice, against other functions that are also
with ropoct to non trial conduct, such as invotigations, plac, and the re opening of cases, See
Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 607, 636-37,
642 (1999) (the prosecutor is "a representative of, as well as a lawyer for, [the] government").
59. Vorenberg, supra note 57, at 1523-27.
60. See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosccutorg: Lessons from
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009). Barkow not only notes the considerable scope of
prosecutorial discretion, id. at 884-86, but also relies on the analogy between prosecutorial and
agency discretion, id. at 887-94.
61. Green, supra note 58, at 619.
62. Id. at 611.
63. Id. at 631.
64. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 65 (2011); see also Bruce A. Green & Fred C.
Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 896; K. Babe Howell, Prosecutorial
Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in an Overburdened Criminal Justice System, 27 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 285, 306-08 (2014); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial
Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 50-53 (1991).
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legitimate and public-regarding, such as maximizing the swiftness and
sureness of punishment in order best to deter future misconduct.6 5
The ethical situation in which agencies find themselves is not
dissimilar. When judicial deference is available, agencies, like
prosecutors, enjoy unreviewable discretion within fairly broad
constraints. Both agencies and prosecutors can find the identity of their
principal hazy-is it the government, the people, or their own particular
agency?66 Like prosecutors, therefore, agencies' preoccupying ethical
dilemma is how to avoid "abuse of discretion." This concern, of course,
is a touchstone in administrative law.6 7
This is not to say that the substance of agencies' ethical
obligations is the same as prosecutors'. To the contrary, public ethics
are determined by role, and the role of each is very different. It would
be wrongheaded indeed to imagine that agencies should seek primarily
to "do justice." The analogy with prosecutors is meant only to capture
the sort of ethical inquiry that this Article undertakes.
C. The Relationship of Deference to Duty
In other contexts, the term "scope of discretion" has been defined
to mean "the ability to make decisions ... without the limits of rules or
other constraints on freedom of action, including judicial review."68
Under that definition, this Article concerns what it means for agencies
to act ethically within the scope of discretion that they enjoy with
respect to statutory interpretation. Under a standard Chevron or other
deference framework, courts will set aside agency action outside that
scope; the question here therefore applies only within it.
It is useful to consider the polar cases. Agencies' scope of
discretion in statutory interpretation is vast in some cases and zero in
others. It is vast in cases where there will be no judicial review of any
65. See PETER A. JOY & KEVIN C. MCMUNIGAL, DO NO WRONG: ETHICS FOR PROSECUTORS
AND DEFENDERS 14 (2009).
66. See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 959, 963 (2009) (describing prosecutors as "agents who imperfectly serve their
principals (the public) and other stakeholders (such as victims and defendants)"); Criddlo, cupra
note 18, at 164 -65 (describing agencies as "agents of the executive branch, Congress, or the people
as a whole"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 97 cmt. (c) (AM. LAW INST.
2000) ("No universal definition of the client of a governmental lawyer is possible. For example, it
has been asserted that government lawyers represent the public, or the public interest.").
67. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (requiring reviewing courts to "hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ,,an abuse of discretion").
68. Vorenberg, supra note 57, at 1523-24.
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kind.6 9 Agency action is unreviewable if a statute "preclude[s] judicial
review" or commits "agency action... [entirely and unreviewably] to
agency discretion by law";70 if no one will have standing to invoke
judicial review; 71 or if no one will be harmed in ways that will motivate
them sufficiently to seek judicial review. 72 Agencies may also avoid
judicial review by embedding interpretations in non-final actions, in
refusals to take action, or in specific kinds of final actions that
particular statutes exempt from review. 73 They may also avoid review
by timing their actions strategically. 74
When there is no judicial review, the scope of agency discretion
is at its apogee. Absent a judicial check, the agency is the sole and final
arbiter of statutory meaning. An agency's obligations regarding law
interpretation in such a situation cannot be less demanding when there
is no review as when there is deferential review. An agency that knows
it will not face judicial review is not entitled to act ultra vires. It
therefore must act within its best assessment of its legislatively granted
powers. This principle has straightforward analogues for all
constitutional and statutory interpretation outside of the courts.
Members of Congress and the President, when their actions are
unreviewable, must obey the Constitution and conform to the laws. 75
Agencies are no different. The obligations discussed in this Article,
60. But ace Richard J. Pierce, Jr., How Agcncies Should Give Meaning to the Statutei Thcy
Administer: A Response to Mashaw and Strauss, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 204 (2007) (arguing that
"all agency statutory interpretations are subject to de novo review and potential rejection by a
court through application of Chevron step one" (emphasis added)).
70. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2012). The courts have strongly cabined this category. See Heckler v.
Chancy, 470 U.S. 821, 826 (1985) (reiterating that the "oommitted to agency discretion by law"
exception applies only when "the substantive statute left the courts with no law to apply" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
71. Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility,
Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review ofAgency Statutory Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV.
528, 537 n.23 (2006).
72. Jamos J. Brudnoy, Legislation and Regulation in the Core Curriculum A Virtue or a
Necessity?, 65 J.L. EDUC. 3, 13-14 (2015) (most "minor" agency actions remain "unreviewed by
courts or essentially unreviewable"); Stephenson, supra note 71, at 537 n.23; cf David A. Strauss,
Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 113, 115 (1993) (same issues
arise regarding unreviewable executive interpretation of the Constitution).
73. See Bryan Clark & Amanda C. Leiter, Regulatory Hide and Seek: What Agencies Can
(and Can't) Do to Limit Judicial Review, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1687, 1689-92 (2011) (giving examples).
74. See id.
75. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 219, 239 (2004) (legislature); Morrison, supra note 14, at 1223 (executive).
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therefore, constitute a floor for agencies acting outside the shadow of
judicial review.
The other, more interesting circumstance is when there is
judicial review (or a reasonable expectation thereof76), but that review
proceeds without deference. Here the scope of discretion is effectively
zero. Such situations are fairly common. In many states, courts review
de novo, without deference, some or all categories of final agency
action. 77 In the federal system, review is non-deferential when agency
action falls within various exceptions to Chevron. The statutory
interpretation supporting the agency action might have constitutional
ramifications78 or be of such deep "economic and political significance"
that Chevron is set aside.79 The interpretation in question might trigger
one or the other canon of construction whose application trumps
Chevron deference.80 It might involve foreign affairs in a particular
way.81
Finally, the interpretation might be in the Mead twilight of
actions insufficiently authoritative to merit Chevron deference.8 2 Final
actions that fall outside of Chevron under Mead are a special case,
because per Mead many of them receive Skidmore deference.83 I return
to so-called Skidmore "deference" in Part III.B below. In this Section,
76. An ample literature demonstrates that Chevron and its analogues are not applied
consistently, especially at the Supreme Court level. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to
Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 980-90 (1992); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the
Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 359-63 (1994) [hereinafter Merrill,
Textualism]; Thomas Miles & Cass Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical
Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825 (2006); Cass Sunstein, Law and
Administration after Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2092 (1990) ('If the court has a firm
conviction that the agency interpretation violato the statute, that interpretation must fail ...
even if a reaoonable person might accept the agoncy'c view.").
77. See Saiger, supra note 4, at 558.
78. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps. of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173
(2001).
79. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)). See generally Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding
Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN L. REV. 19 (2010) (reviewing doctrine).
80. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988) (constitutional avoidance); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208
(1988) (canons against retroactivity); Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of
Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 77 (2008).
81. See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 722-
25 (2000).
82. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-31 (2001).
83. Id. at 234-35.
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for clarity of analysis, I assume that a reviewing court that does not
defer interprets the statute de novo.
When there is non-deferential judicial review, agencies that
otherwise might seek the "best" interpretation of a statute will be
reviewed by a court doing the same thing. It might be both reasonable
and appropriate, therefore, for an agency working in the shadow of non-
deferential review to adopt an interpretation it considers to be
interpretively suboptimal, on the grounds that this is the interpretation
the reviewing court will adopt. An example would be a court whose
precedents strongly suggest, but do not demand, an interpretation with
which an agency disagrees. An agency might ethically adopt such an
interpretation nonetheless. After all, it is the court that will say what
the law is; so, under typical circumstances, it is hardly useful for the
agency to do anything other than anticipate the courts.8 4 On this
dimension, the agency is in more or less the same situation as a private
lawyer advising a client regarding a legal regime that is uncertain. The
lawyer has professional obligations to interpret the law fairly,85 and
may also have opinions about what the law should be understood to
mean; but the client primarily relies upon her to determine, as best she
can, what the law will be decided to mean. Another apt analogy is a
lower court anticipating review by a higher court, whose account of the
law is generally the law as it expects the higher court to understand
it. 86
To be sure, agency decisionmaking absent deference has its own
ethical dimension. The agency, like any lawyer, might face
uncertainties in anticipating the court, and therefore be in a position to
choose among multiple predictions.8 7 Moreover, the agency is not the
84. Pierce, supra note 69, at 202 (noting that absent deference, an "agency has no practical
choice but to attempt to anticipate and replicate the interpretive process a revioNing court will
use").
85. See W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1167, 1171
(2005) ("RN]o matter how clear a rule appearo to be, it will always be ambiguous enough to be
manipulated .... Professionalism ... is therefore a principle for regulating the exercise of
interpretive judgment.").
86. Scc Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Loohing Aspects of
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9-22 (1994) (articulating two models of lower-
court decisionmaking, the "precedent" and "proxy" models, both of which direct lower court
attention to higher court opinions, and the latter of which undoretande a lower court directly to
anticipate how the higher court would rule in the case before it).
57. An important special case of this concern is uncertainty regarding whether the courts
will defer to the agency's interpretation. See supra note 76. It seems straightforward that, so long
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same as a private lawyer advising a client in the sense that the agency
has its own duties to the public and to uphold the law. So an agency
might feel a duty (rather than just a strategy) not merely to predict the
outcome but to convince the reviewing, non-deferential court that the
agency's own reading is the best. It could do this both by building a
strong record and then by litigating it effectively. At the extreme, one
can imagine Saturday-Night-Massacre scenarios in which an ethical
agency must stand up for her own statutory interpretation
notwithstanding likely judicial reversal, just as she ought to stand up
for her own legal opinion notwithstanding likely sacking by the
President or reversal by a more senior executive.88 But there must be
room for an agency, in more quotidian circumstances, ethically to
acknowledge that when it is not the final decisionmaker and cannot
reasonably expect to change that decisionmaker's mind, it is reasonable
to adopt ab initio the view that it best anticipates that final
decisionmaker will take rather than its own preferred view.8 9
What distinguishes deferential review is that it renders the
agency's decision both final and discretionary. Deference creates room
for the exercise of discretion. This is evident in the peculiar
administrative-law doctrine that an agency that adopts a permissible
construction of an ambiguous statute, but does so in the mistaken belief
that the construction it adopts is the only permissible construction,
receives no deference. In Arizona v. Thompson, for example, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed a Department
of Health and Human Services regulation that prohibited states from
spending federal block grant monies awarded under the Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF") program to pay administrative
costs common to the TANF program, Medicaid, and Food Stamps.90 The
Department's rule was not entitled to Chevron deference, the court
as there is a reasonable possibility of deference, agencies bear whatever enhanced ethical
obligations are associated with deference.
88. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Protestantism and Comparative Competence: A Reply to
Professors Levinson and Eisgruber, 83 GEO. L.J. 385, 387-88 (1994).
89. Cf. Morrison, supra note 14, at 1197 (making the same observation with respect to
presidential actions subject to dc novo judicial review). An intermediatc case is an agency that
identifies political or policy gains to be had from promulgating an interprCtation it expccts to bc
overturned by a nondeferential court, but feels no ethical or moral duty to force a confrontation.
The arguments in this Article suggest that such behavior is not obligatory and is normativcly
appropriate when and only when the agency believes its interpretation to be the best available.
90. 281 F.3d 248, 251 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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held, because the agency "did not purport to exercise discretion."91
Rather, the Department believed--erroneously-that its position was
required by the statute.92 Determinations that the agency believes to be
compelled by the statute are not entitled to discretion; unless the
permissible construction is adopted as an exercise of discretion, the
agency action is remanded should the court disagree. 93 In the language
of an earlier District of Columbia Circuit case, "[w]hile the Secretary
ha[d] discretion... that discretion must [have been] exercised through
the eyes of one who realizes she possesses it. ' 94
In many respects, the approach in Arizona v. Thompson and its
sister cases seems perverse. The agency's decision is remanded because
the agency found it to be too obvious; had it made the same decision
after protracted agonizing, it would have been upheld. (The Thompson
doctrine thus encourages agencies, as a matter of practice, always to
state formally that a statute is susceptible to multiple interpretations,
even if they doubt that alternative interpretations are viable.95) But,
surface perversity notwithstanding, at its heart the doctrine is
defensible. To make an interpretive choice is a fundamentally different
thing than to do what is clearly required; courts justifiably treat these
two processes differently. The expositors of the doctrine emphasize,
quoting Chevron's language, that deference is triggered only because
the ambiguity of the statute requires the agency to "bring its experience
and expertise to bear in light of competing interests at stake. '96 If the
agency sees only one interpretation, if it sees no "competing interests"
or demand for its "expertise," those triggering conditions are absent.
Discretion, in other words, creates particular ethical issues. The
discretionary interpretive choice, which then resists review, involves
enhanced ethical demands, like a decision to prosecute or accept a plea.
91. Id. at 253.
92. Id. at 253-54.
93. Id. at 254; accord Gila River Indian Cmty. v. United States, 729 F.3d 1139, 1149 (9th
Cir. 2013), as amcndrd (July 9, 2013) ("[Bccause the agency misapprehended the clarity of the
statute ... deference is not in order."); Nat'l Org. of Veterans' Advocates, Inc. v. Sec'y of Veterans
Affairs, 314 F.3d 1373, 1378-79 & n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("It is, of course, impermissible for the
Department to adopt regulations in this area on the ground that particular regulations are
required under the unambiguous language of the statutes.").
94. Transitional Hosps. Corp. of La., Inc. v. Shalala, 222 F.3d 1019, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
95. Cf. Eliabeth V. Fuote, S1 tiatutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron
Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 715 (2007)
(d, gaing that Chevron itsclf motivates agencies to seck interpretive ambiguity even when it ic not
clearly present).
96. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984) (quoted
by PDK Labs. Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 797-98 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
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D. What Does It Mean for an Interpretation of a Statute
to Be "Good" or the "Best"?
Can one interpretation of a statute be "better" than another?
Than all others? If not, it is incoherent to suggest that agencies might
have a duty to adopt the "best" reading of a statute.
Judicial and academic debates regarding what constitutes
"good" statutory interpretation are stalemated. Textualists think that
many, most, or all interpretations based on analysis of legislative
"purpose" and/or legislative "history" are intellectually confused,
constitutionally illegitimate, and inappropriately politicized.
Purposivists think that textualism is crabbed, misleading, ahistorical-
and inappropriately politicized. Purposivists "look over the crowd and
pick out their friends."97 Textualists are too ingenuous and too
ingenious. 98 Purposivists don't understand the nature of legislation. 99
Textualists don't understand the nature of language.100 And so on.
This is of course a caricature of the multifarious, nuanced, and
necessary arguments that multiply to fill the appellate reporters, the
law reviews, and the university press announcements. These
arguments are serious, sophisticated, and important to agencies' work.
But the purposivist/textualist standoff1 0 1 means that, as a matter of
ethics in role, it is both difficult and unproductive to suggest that
anyone has an obligation to throw their lot in with one side or the other.
Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia, who could not agree about
interpretation, each upheld their respective positions ethically. This is
so even as there is every reason to welcome present and future efforts
by any interpretive school to convert another by force of persuasive
argument.
97. This observation, now a chestnut, originates with Judge Harold Leventhal. See Patricia
M. Wald, Some Observations on the Usc of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 6
IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 n.143 (1983) (citing a conversation with Judge Leventhal). It is today
ubiquitous in the federal reporters and the literature. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511,
519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Cmty. Care Found. v. Thompson, 318 F.3d 219,
226 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
98. Merrill, Textualism, supra note 76, at 354.
99. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS § 67 (2012).
100. William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power"
in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 992 (2001); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 623 (1990).
101. Mashaw, supra note 14, at 510 ('Textualists are at war with purposivists; plain language
advocates joust with those prepared to seek meaning in legislative history.").
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This might be a reasonable position to take with respect to
judicial interpretation but not with respect to agency interpretation.
The literature has coalesced around the view that agencies not only are
but also should be purposivist interpreters of their statutes, even if
courts are not. 102 The positive claim is that agencies, in order to
understand their governing statute, routinely very heavily depend upon
legislative history, communication with the Congress, and other
indicators of legislative purpose. 10 3 Agencies' reliance upon the
Congress for their ability to carry out their agendas creates a "profound"
and "continuous incentive" for them "to act as faithful agents" of the
legislature and "universally to honor" legislative expectations; the
"Congress ... is a constant and immediate presence in their
consciousness." 10 4 These institutional constraints ineluctably lead them
when interpreting statutes to serious inquiry into legislative purpose. 105
Normatively, the argument is that this is as it should be.
Professors Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule suggest that even if
some form of textualism is the preferable modality of judicial statutory
interpretation, purposive interpretation is likely to be superior for
agencies that are technically competent, politically accountable, and
generally trusted.10 6 Some, taking their cue from an early article by
Professor Peter Strauss, argue that purposive interpretation allows
agencies more accurately to give effect to the substantive intention of
the Congress, and thus best to realize the uneasy but genuine place of
agencies in the American scheme of separation of powers.10 7 Professor
Jerry Mashaw recasts Strauss's argument in more strongly normative
terms, suggesting that Strauss "persuasively" implies that for an
agency to ignore its own "insights into legislative purposes and
meaning" would make it less than a "faithful agent."108 Mashaw himself
is less taken with legislative history than Strauss, because he
prioritizes agency responsiveness to contemporary political
102. See supra note 38.
103. See KATZMANN, supra note 16, at 26-27.
104. See Peter Strauss, Book Review, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 443, 448-49 (2015) (reviewing
ROBERT KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)).
105. Id. at 448.
106. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 40, at 928-30; accord D. Strauss, supra note 72, at 113;
Sunstein, supra note 8, at 2596-97.
107. Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
549, 575 (1985); Mashaw, supra note 14, at 511; Mashaw, supra note 35, at 509; Strauss, supra
note 14, at 347.
108. Mashaw, supra note 14, at 511; accord Mashaw, supra note 35, at 509.
2016] 1253
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
authority; 10 9 but he agrees that agencies doing their jobs well will
interpret statutes differently from courts.110
Professor Kevin Stack's important variation on this approach is
to argue that the Congress, by passing regulatory statutes, "impose[s]
a duty on agencies to carry out those powers in accordance with the
principles or purposes the statutes establish." '111 Agencies should
interpret in a purposive fashion, argues Stack, because of a
congressional directive. 112
Other arguments offer versions of normative superiority less
grounded in the statutes themselves than Stack's. They argue that
purposive agency interpretation is better in the sense that it makes
better law, that it is more responsive to circumstances and to nuance,
that it is less likely to take off in some undesirable direction that ill-
serves the republic and its citizens.11 3 The Congress, had it been able to
anticipate the circumstances, would of course never have desired bad,
unresponsive, or undesirable law, and so again the agency is a "better"
agent of the Congress when it interprets purposively.
While the case for agency purposivism is sympathetic and
strong, it still falls short of justifying purposivist interpretation as the
"best" sort of interpretation in ethical terms. Stack, for example, argues
that agencies should be purposivist because "Congress, in its statutory
delegations, directs" them to do so.1 14 On this view, were Congress to
pass a statute that did not contain or that contradicted this directive,
then agencies would have no obligation to interpret purposively.
Similarly, one can imagine that an administration with a particular
philosophy of law and/or attitude to regulation might appoint
textualists to agencies, just as it would to courts, in order to achieve
narrow readings of the law and of regulatory mandates. This might be
foolish politics and bad policy; it also might not succeed on the
appointing administration's own terms. But it is hardly unethical. And,
of course, purposivism still ties the interpreter to some extent to the
text, 115 so any gulf between textualists and purposivists in an agency is
109. Mashaw, supra note 14, at 511-14. Political pressure is discussed infra notes 145-152
and accompanying text.
110. Mashaw, supra note 14, at 522-23 & tbl.1.
111. Stack, supra note 14, at 875-76.
112. Id. Stack's approach implies that whether the Congress intends agencies to interpret
otatutes purpocively depends upon tho structure of that statute.
113. See Herz, supra note 16, at 96.
114. Stack, supra note 14, at 875.
115. See infra note 119.
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a matter of degree, not of kind. Therefore: if an agency that interprets
like Breyer would interpret a statute in one way, and one that
interprets like Scalia in another, no ethical principle is available that
could reasonably call one interpretation superior. Again, that is not to
say that there are no jurisprudential (better, "regleprudential")
principles that could do so-but, at this writing and for the foreseeable
future, these principles are, or at least can be, contested.
In a different sense of the question of whether one interpretation
can be better than another, and whether there might often be a "best"
interpretation, the answer is obviously "yes." "Yes" is the right answer
from within a given sense of interpretive principles. 116 No lawyer or
academic advocates complete indeterminacy with regard to statutory
interpretation. Given any plausible interpretive framework, some
interpretations are better than others-at least in most cases. The goal
of interpretation, under whatever theory, is in part to avoid interpretive
"error."117
This is obvious for a Scalia-style textualist: not only are
textualist arguments superior, for example, to those based
illegitimately upon legislative history, but there are good textualist
arguments and bad ones. Scalia's most vociferous, anti-textualist
interlocutors think similarly about their own interpretive principles. A
purposivist interpretation can be good or not as good; one might be
clearly better than other, probably better than a third, and in close
contention with a fourth.
This internal perspective is the one this Article adopts. Agencies
can interpret statutes in good faith using a variety of methodologies.
And the diversity of available methodologies will frequently yield
diverse results. Agencies have no obligation to adopt the interpretation
that Justice Breyer, Justice Scalia, or you the reader would consider the
"best." I argue here only for the claim that an agency must hew to the
interpretation that the agency itself determines, in good faith, to be the
best interpretation.
116. See Stephenson, supra note 71, at 538 (arguing and offering an example for the claim
that any judge's internal perspective determines a continuum of interpretations from best to worst,
in the view of that judge, regardless of interpretive method). This appears to be the use of the word
"best" adopted by the Office of Legal Counsel when it purports to provide "advice based on its best
understanding of what the law requires." Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant
Att'y Gen., Re: Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions, at 1 (July 16, 2010),
available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/defaultfiles/olc/legacy/2010/08/26/olc-legal-advice-
opinions.pdf. The practice of OLC is discussed additionally infra notes 154-155 and accompanying
text.
117. Mashaw, supra note 14, at 517.
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E. Conflicts Between Interpretation and Policy Preference
To ask whether the reading of a statute an agency considers
"best" from its internal interpretive perspective (call it A) must be
adopted over the reading it prefers from its internal policy perspective
(call it B) implies that the two will be different, at least some of the
time. This is surely the case if an agency is textualist in its approach to
statutory interpretation; there is no reason to expect textual
interpretation to track policy preferences. But the assumption might
not hold if an agency interprets its statutes purposively, as nearly all
scholars believe that nearly all agencies do and most scholars believe
that agencies should.118 For such an agency, it might be that, as among
potential reasonable interpretations of the statute, the "best"
interpretation, by definition, is always precisely the one that furthers
the policy the agency prefers. That is, it might be that A and B are
always the same.
Consider what it means for an agency that interprets its statute
purposively to identify A and B. Such an agency, having limited itself
to interpretations that are reasonable, identifies from among them
whichever one, in its own estimation, is the best policy (B). To choose B
is to choose the policy that will yield the best effects: it is the one that
best fulfills the agency's mandate and advances its goals. But in
determining what is goal-advancing or mandate-maximizing, the
agency, assuming that all its reasons are public-regarding, is perhaps
doing no more and no less than interpreting the statute in light of its
purposes. It is, after all, the statute that sets agency goals,
operationalizes its mandate, defines the mission, and determines what
is best. Therefore, what the agency regards as the best policy (B) will
be, invariably, the same as what it understands to be the best
interpretation of the statute (A). Both are the approach to the statute
that best effectuates its purpose(s), from the agency's internal
perspective.
It is no objection that an agency might sometimes prefer to do
something that the statute fairly clearly does not allow. By hypothesis,
our agency restricts itself only to reasonable interpretations. The
reasonableness assumption assures that, in Professor William
Eskridge's important formulation, the agency will not promulgate any
interpretation that "impose[s] on words a meaning they will not
118. See supra notes 102-113 and accompanying text.
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bear."119 Both A and B are reasonable. The reasonableness assumption
also excludes cases of what Eskridge calls "rule-of-law shirking" or
"democratic shirking" by agencies, both of which involve deforming the
meaning of the statute.120 Such deformations are by definition
unreasonable, and therefore outside the deference space.
Nor can an agency engage in what Eskridge calls "policy
shirking," whereby the agency "fail[s] to pursue the congressional goals
effectively, perhaps because of interest group capture or simply because
of lethargy and inertia."121 Again by hypothesis, the agency determines
its preferred policy based upon purely public-regarding criteria.
Therefore its preference cannot depart from its internal understanding
of its mission.
Chevron itself can be read to anticipate precisely this kind of
policy-driven interpretation.1 22 Chevron involved a decision by the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") regarding the meaning of the
Clean Air Act's category of pollutants emitted by a "major stationary
source." EPA chose to read the word "source" so that it could include
multiple smokestacks within a single industrial site; the EPA
postulated an imaginary "bubble" over the site that could merge all
emissions from that site into one "source." The Chevron Court says that
the reason EPA's reading "is entitled to deference" is that the agency's
view that the statutory phrase "major stationary source" was consistent
with the bubble "represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly
competing interests.1' 23 The Court refers to EPA's conclusion as a "wise
119. Eskridge uses this formulation repeatedly in his work. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 4,
at 445; William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
531, 532 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)). Eskridge credits the formulation to Professors Hart and
Sacks. See 2 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1200 (tent. ed. 1958) (cited in, e.g., William N. Eskridge,
Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 333
n.43 (1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1007, 1038 n.119 (1989)).
120. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 433.
121. Id.
122. As is well-known, Chevron assumed that purpose-oriented interpretation,
uncontroversial in 1984, would be standard throughout the legal system. Cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Nat. Re. Df. Council, Inc., 4C7 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984) (interpretation under otcp one procced3
"employing traditional tools of statutory construction").
123. Id. at 865.
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policy."124 The Court takes up the issue of wisdom particularly in the
peroration of the case:
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized,
really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable
choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal
judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made
by those who do.
1 25
These statements sound as if, once an interpretation is within the
Chevron space of all possible reasonable interpretations, what the
agency is doing when it chooses is simply making policy. If what
Chevron itself is doing in step two is deferring to EPA policy, then it is
hard to see in what way there is light between the agency's preferred
policy and its preferred interpretation.
This account-that agencies are merely instantiating policy
preferences when they pick a policy within the Chevron space-has
been picked up by some courts and commentators. In the courts of
appeal, the most striking instance is the position of the District of
Columbia Circuit that agency interpretations rate deference only if that
interpretation results from a policy judgment. 126 This rule emerged
from a case, PDK Labs, in which the Administrator of the Drug
Enforcement Agency interpreted a statute in a particular way because
he thought it was clear. The court disagreed and thought the statute
was ambiguous, although it thought the Agency's interpretation was a
possible, reasonable interpretation. Nevertheless the court declined to
defer to the agency, on the ground that the agency had "reached [its]
conclusion without mentioning any policy considerations or other
matters within the agency's expertise. ' 127 Chevron deference, held the
court, does not apply whenever an agency "choose [s] between competing
meanings." It is available only when an agency "bring[s] its experience
and expertise to bear in light of competing interests at stake. 1 28 In
other words, a court defers only if the agency chooses its most-preferred
policy from among the alternatives that are reasonable as a matter of
interpretation.
Several academic commentators have taken upon an even
stronger version of this view, arguing that agencies choosing among
124. Id.
125. Id. at 866.
126. PDK Labs. Inc. v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 794 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 797-98 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45).
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policy approaches within a Chevron space are only making policy, and
are not interpreting the statute in any meaningful sense of that word.
Responding to analyses by Professors Jerry Mashaw and Peter Strauss
who understood (the latter especially) statutory interpretation to be the
ubiquitous and quotidian business of agencies, their daily bread and
butter,129 Professor Richard Pierce insisted that this was a fundamental
category error. Agencies, once within the Chevron space, are not
interpreting-not "explain[ing] or tell[ing] the meaning of'-statutes at
all. 130 Rather, they are making policy, an activity distinct and
fundamentally different from interpretation. 131
Professor Elizabeth Foote extends and elaborates Pierce's
claims. She argues that statutory construction on the one hand and
"carrying out" or "implementing" statutory commands on the other are
distinct and discrete activities, and that agencies are not engaged in the
former when they determine policy preferences. 132 It is a "misnomer" to
label policymaking as statutory construction. 133
Professors Pierce and Foote would likely approve of PDK. They
also are aficionados of the view that Chevron step two, in which courts
evaluate the agency's decision for reasonableness, is coextensive with
the judicial analysis, commonly identified with Motor Vehicles
Manufacturers v. State Farm, whether an agency decision must be set
aside because it is "arbitrary [or] capricious." 134 To Pierce, "[i]t seems
129. Mashaw, supra note 14, at 513 (noting that each agency "control[s]... what might be
called its 'interpretative agenda' . . . the Chevron doctrine recognizes a convergence of
interpretation and policymaking"); Strauss, supra note 14, at 329 ('The organic nature of agency
relationships with their statutes, that agencies essentially live the process of statutory
interpretation, makes it of special importance to see how that occurs.... Legislative history has a
centraity and iiiipotance for agency lawycrs that might not readily be conceived by persons who
are outside government and are accustomed to considering its relevance only to actual or
prospective judicial resolution of discrete disputes."); accord Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency
Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 2 (1990) ("Agencies
continually interpret the statutes they administer."); D. Strauss, supra note 72, at 113; Sunstein,
supra note 8, at 2588 ("interpretation was the central part of [the agency's] job").
130. Pierce, supra note 69, at 199.
131. Id. at 200, 205 (stating that when agencies make policy, "they are not involved in the
process of statutory interpretation").
132. Foote, supra note 95, at 675.
133. Id. at 695.
134. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 41 (1983) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). The question whether Chevron step two and State
Farm are coextensive is a persistent puzzle in administrative law. Cf. Judulang v. Holder, 565
U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011) ("[I]n this case," Chevron step-two analysis would be "the same" as a State
Farm analysis, "because under Chevron step two, we ask whether an agency interpretation is
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apparent that step two of Chevron is State Farm."135 This is a
"pragmatic approach," because "[a]s applied, the two tests are
functionally indistinguishable." 136 They are indistinguishable in the
sense that the selection of one reasonable interpretation from a set of
potential reasonable interpretations-which is what the Court purports
to assure under Chevron step two-is the same as determining that a
policy is reasonable and therefore not "arbitrary"-which is what the
Court purports to assure in applying State Farm. 137 At the point where
an agency reaches step two, policy and what the courts call
"interpretation" are identical. Therefore, an agency's internally "best"
purposive interpretation and "best" policy are always the same.
These arguments and authorities for the identity of best
purposive interpretation and most preferred policy ultimately fail to
convince. As a matter of authority, the PDK rule that agencies must
weigh competing policy considerations in order to receive deference 13
(a rule not established in all circuits) might be read to demand some
kind of comparative policy analysis as part of the interpretive process.
But this does not make the two processes coextensive. An agency could
weigh policy goals in the context of purposive interpretation and still
emerge with an interpretation that demanded a policy different from
the one that simply maximized its policy preferences. And Chevron's
own emphasis upon policy determinations must be understood in light
of its repeated characterization of an agency's choice of approach from
among reasonable alternatives-such as the EPA's choice to read
"stationary source" to embrace the bubble-as "construction" or
"interpretation."139
More broadly, the reasons that Strauss and Mashaw give for
characterizing the process by which an agency gives meaning to its
statute as "interpretation" are good ones. They easily survive the
objections of Pierce and Foote. Consider Chevron itself. It takes whether
the statutory term "stationary source" can include a "bubble" over an
'arbitrary or capricious in substance.' ") (Kagan, J., for a unanimous Court) (internal citations
omitted).
135. RICHARD PIERCE, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.6, at 172 (4th ed. 2002).
136. Id. § 3.3 at 173-74.
137. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46.
138. See supra notes 126-128 and accompanying text.
139. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 837, 844 (1984) (two
uses); id. at 857, 860, 862, 863 (several uses).
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entire facility to be a question of statutory construction. 140 If the answer
is yes, there follows a policy question whether the agency wants to read
"source" in that way. EPA did not ever claim that "source" had to be
read to embrace a whole facility. But the interpretive question is
jurisprudentially prior. Before EPA could choose whether to treat
multiple smokestacks as a single source, it had to determine whether
the best meaning of "source" was broad enough to allow it to do so.
Professor Strauss in particular emphasizes that the prior
analysis, of what the statute means, can sometimes be restrictive. In
particular, legislative history materials can lead to interpretations that
might prevent an agency from going where it otherwise might wish to
go.141 Strauss evokes an agency attorney at work in a library of
legislative history materials. If that attorney is "responsible," Strauss
says, she will "pore through those materials.., seeking help in
understanding and/or justification. 142  In doing so, Strauss's
conscientious lawyer "acquires a sense of political history and
possibility that will both suggest and constrain."143 Sometimes
historical materials compel interpretive positions that an agency cannot
then ignore if it "do[es] not wish to destroy morale or an internal sense
of the agency's legitimacy." 144 Legislative history has pride of place in
the purposive toolbox, and Strauss has no doubt that its use, and
therefore purposivist interpretation itself, can constrain as well as
expand statutory meaning.
Certainly, the possibility that Chevron step two and State Farm
demand the same judicial inquiry in no way implies that an agency,
having determined that multiple statutory readings are legitimate, can
ignore interpretive considerations and confine itself strictly to policy
analysis. Even if Pierce is correct that it is the same for a court to
determine that an agency's resolution of a statutory ambiguity is
reasonable qua interpretation and reasonable qua policy, an agency
choosing the best interpretation from a set of reasonable interpretations
140. Id. at 840; accord John Willis, The McRuer Report: Lawyers' Values and Civil Servants'
Values, 18 U. TORONTO L.J. 351, 360 (1968):
When the Labour Relations Board is applying a standard laid down by its governing act, for
example "appropriate unit," it is, though in form interpreting the Act and deciding a
"question of law," in truth devising its "unit" policy through the eyes of people who are
familiar with labour conditions and labour understandings.
141. Strauss, supra note 14, at 330-31.
142. Id. at 330.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 331.
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could be doing something distinct from choosing the most desirable
policy from a set of reasonable policies.
In particular, we know of one very important set of
considerations that affect agencies' policy preferences but, very likely,
not their interpretations. These are what are often called "political"
factors. Mashaw tentatively describes (but is careful to say that he does
not endorse) purposive agency interpretation by urging his reader to
"imagine agency statutes as works-in-progress, to be shaped and
molded by continuous interaction among the implementing agency, the
political branches and affected interests" in an "ongoing process of
agency implementation.1' 45 And Chevron itself endorses the view that
the politics of a sitting administration can and should influence a
statutory interpretation: "[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated
policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation,
properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy
to inform its judgments. 146
That famous statement from Chevron uses the phrase "wise
policy," which is not quite the same as politics. Nevertheless, most
modern scholars agree that agencies can indeed consider "political"
factors. 147 However, the agency's nonpolitical reasons must be sufficient
on their own to justify its decision, without regard to political factors.1 48
And an administrative record cannot explicitly advert to goals unless
those goals are among those in fact embraced by the statute.1 49 Agencies
145. Mashaw, supra note 14, at 523.
146. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
147. See Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 141, 144 (2012) ("Mhe understanding of the administrative state that prompted
courts to develop hard look rcvicw accepts that agency decisions are political and pioperly so.");
Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE
L.J. 2, 35-39 (2009) (documenting "widespread acceptance" of the view "that many policymaking
decisions made by agencies cannot be resolved through a myopic technocratic lens but rather are
highly political decisions that should be made by politically accountable institutions"). But see
Enrique Armijo, Politics, Rulemaking, and Judicial Review: A Response to Professor Watts, 62
ADMIN. L. REV. 573, 575 (2010); cf. Marcia E. Mulkey, A Crisis of Conscience and the Government
Lawyer, 14 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 649, 650 (2005) ("government lawyers are often
defensive about offering policy advice," as distinguished from legal advice).
148. See Watts, supra note 147, at 35-39 (noting the "widespread acceptance" of the view "that
many policymaking decisions made by agencies cannot be resolved through a myopic tuchnocratic
lens but rather are highly political decisions that should be made by politically accountable
institutions").
149. Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating
that an agency is free to consider non statutory factors, but cannot "nubstitutc nc-v, goal ii, place
of the statutory objectives without explaining how these actions arc con3istent with her authority
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therefore have every incentive not to document or discuss whatever
political considerations they do take into account, and to craft records
that plausibly defend their conclusions without reference to such
factors. 150 There is debate about whether this incentive is pernicious,
and whether agencies should be permitted explicitly to consider and
discuss political factors leading to their decisions. 151
Most scholars participating in this debate understand "political"
to mean not only "non-technocratic" but "external," coming from the
President or the Congress. This is a somewhat narrower category than
the notion I am defending in this Section of public-regarding policy
preferences independent of the statute. But such reasons are surely an
instance of such independent preferences. So, if the President urges an
agency to adopt one interpretation rather than another because he
hopes to benefit a particular state or region in economic distress, 15 2 or
if the chairman of the relevant oversight committee does so in order to
protect an industry important to his constituency, these are reasons
that are public-regarding but not anticipated by the statute or fairly
embraced by any reasonable interpretation, even a purposive one, of
that statute. If, then, Professor Kathryn Watts and others are correct
that there is a legitimate place for politics in agency decisionmaking,
then there are some cases where A (the agency's "best" interpretation
from its internal perspective) and B (the interpretation that best
advances the agency's policy preference) are not the same even for the
purposively interpreting agency.153
under the statute"; agency action must be "squared with the statutory objectives that Congress
specified as the primary guidelines for administrative action in this area").
150. Watts, supra note 147, at 43 ("[P]olitical factors influencing agency docisiono aro kopt
out of the public's eye and are not subject to opcn public scrutiny."); accord Nina A. Mendelson,
Disclosing 'Political" Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1129 (2010).
151. Watts, supra note 147, at 7-8.
152. Hlard questions, not considered here, are whother it should count as a public regarding
reason if the President's motive is not to ameliorate economic distress but to carry the hard-pressed
region in hi3 reelection bid, or if the committee chair is concerned with the important industry not
bccausc of her contituents' jobs but in order to stay in the good gracos of its lobbyists. President
ul chali -would often not communicate these true motivc to the agency, but agencies would just as
often nevertheless be equipped to identify them with confidence. See Jodi L. Short, The Political
Turn in American Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1831
& nn.111-113 (2011) (citing other scholars); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 97 cmt. f (2000) ("Courts have stressed that a lawyer representing a governmental
client nust 3cat to advance the public interest in the representation and not merely the partisan
or personal interests of the government entity or officer involved .. " (emphasis added)).
153. The caveat should be noted that for the camp of administrative law theorists known as
"unitarians," who believe that agencies are truly mere agents of the president, presidential
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This conclusion is consistent with the position of the Office of
Legal Counsel ("OLC"), an executive-branch entity which itself often
reviews agencies' statutory interpretations. The Office felt no need to
take a stand regarding the relative merits of textualism, purposivism,
or any other interpretative method in order to declare that the "OLC
must provide advice based on its best understanding of what the law
requires-... even if that appraisal will constrain the Administration's
or an agency's pursuit of desired practices or policy objectives. ' 154 The
role of the OLC is to provide "dispassionate legal analysis"-
notwithstanding that, as Dean Trevor Morrison points out, "as an office
within the Executive Branch, OLC views the law through a particular
lens, and thus.., its best view of the law might legitimately differ on
some issues from that of a differently situated actor." 155 Even as role
inflects interpretation, interpretation remains distinct from policy
preference.
None of this implies, of course, that the agency's preferred policy,
determined exclusively with regard to public-seeking criteria, must
diverge from its preferred interpretation, arrived at in a purposive
fashion. In many cases, we should expect the two to be the same. This
will be particularly true for regulatory statutes that have a Progressive-
era generality to them, directing agencies to act "in the public interest,"
to set criteria in the best judgment of the agency, or some similarly
vague mandate. It will also frequently be true for a category of statutes
that Professor Kevin Stack identifies, those that explicitly direct
agencies to "carry out" the statute's purpose. 156 Nor do these define the
universe of such cases. Chevron itself is a case where A and B were
likely the same; so is Judulang, the case in which the Court said ("in
this case") that Chevron's step two and State Farm were coextensive
inquiries. 157
proforoncos are not properly understood to be external to agency dclibcration. Sc Christopher C.
DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1075, 1083 (1986); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2325 n.314
(2001) (reviewing literature); Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte
Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 957 (1980). A president's policy preferences
could, in unitarian terms, help to establish his purposive interpretation of the 3tatute. Even for
unitarian, however, some legitimate presidential prcferences for example, thr dcsirc to carry a
particular state in an upcoming election are distinct from any po33iblc purposive analysis of
statutory meaning.
154. Barron, supra note 116, at 1.
155. Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
1448, 1456, 1467 (2010).
156. Stack, supra note 14, at 889 & n.73 (also giving examples of such statutes).
157. See supra note 134.
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But there will be cases in which A and B will diverge. There is
no reason to think such cases will be rare, especially in light of Strauss's
analysis. It is these cases that confront agencies with an ethical
dilemma: How to choose?
II. THREE THEORIES (Two OF THEM WRONG) OF
ETHICAL AGENCY INTERPRETATION
This Part argues that when an agency finds itself in a situation with
the following features-
(1) It identifies reasonable interpretations A and B.
(2) For legitimate reasons unconnected to interpretation, it
would prefer to act based upon B rather than A.
(3) It concludes that A is superior to B as a matter of
interpretation.
(4) Because B is nevertheless a reasonable interpretation, a
reviewing court would enforce an action predicated upon
either A or B.
-the agency has an ethical duty to adopt interpretation A. The
obligation to do so follows from the agency's role as final, authoritative
interpreter of the statute. The role itself follows from the practice of
judicial deference.
This argument therefore rejects two other views: that deference
constitutes permission given to the agency to adopt any interpretation
it likes within the deference space, and that deference is not relevant to
agency obligation at all. This Part first describes these two views and
then rejects them in favor of the argument that the paramount duty of
an agency anticipating deference is to interpret the statute.
A. Deference as Permission
Many agencies and commentators appear to understand
deference as judicial permission for an agency to adopt at its pleasure
any interpretation that the agency plausibly expects to survive
deferential review.
I think this view is broadly held. However, there are very few
contexts in which it is in agencies' interest to articulate such an
understanding. Evidence for its prevalence (or lack thereof) is therefore
hard to come by. There is some. In Professor Christopher Walker's
survey of agency rule-drafters, an enormous majority (ninety percent of
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respondents) report "using" the Chevron doctrine in their work. 158
Walker's survey questions, although rich on many dimensions, do not
make clear in what sense that doctrine might be "used."159
Nevertheless, Walker strongly suggests the view of Chevron-as-
permission is dominant when he quotes a respondent's comment as an
exemplar of the "minority view":
I generally try to make a rule conform with a statute as much as possible. If the statute
has gaps, I rely on my agency's technical expertise for the best, most reasonable way to
fill them.... I think of it in terms of what is practicable and honest, not what the court
cases specifically say. 160
This respondent, who feels an independent duty to "conform" his rule to
the statute, represents the approach of a small minority.
There is also some positive anecdotal evidence for the prevalence
of the deference-as-permission view. Important and often cited is
Professor E. Donald Elliott's on-the-scenes account of the impact of
Chevron at the Environmental Protection Agency. 161 Elliott reports that
prior to Chevron, the EPA Office of General Counsel supplied statutory
interpretations that embraced a " 'single-meaning' conception of
statutes. ' 16 2 The Office conceived of the statute as a "prescriptive text
having a single meaning, discoverable by specialized legal training and
tools. ' 163 After Chevron, the Counsel's Office switched gears, no longer
claiming that the statute "possess[ed] a single prescriptive meaning on
many questions. ' 164 Rather, Office of General Counsel ("OGC") opinions
began to describe
a "policy space," a range of permissible interpretive discretion, within which a variety of
decisions that the agency might make would be legally defensible to varying degrees. So
the task of OGC today is to define the boundaries of legal defensibility, and thereby to
recognize that often there is more than one possible interpretation of the meaning of key
statutory terms and concepts. The agency's policy-makers, not its lawyers, should decide
which of several different but legally defensible interpretations to adopt. 16 5
158. Walker, supra note 14, at 1062.
159. Id. at 1073-75. This is no fault of Walker's, whose research questions focused upon
different issues.
160. Id. at 1062.
161. E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of
Congres, Courto and Agencics in Environmcntal Law, 16 VILL. EkV'rL. L.J. 1, 3 (2005).
162. Id. at 11.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 12.
165. Id. (emphasis added); accord Mashaw, supra note 14, at 532-33 & nn.71, 73.
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Chevron, Elliott concludes, "opened up and validated a policy-making
dialogue within agencies about what interpretation the agency should
adopt for policy reasons, rather than what interpretation the agency
must adopt for legal reasons." 166 As a result of Chevron, "EPA and other
agencies are now more adventurous when interpreting and elaborating
statutory law."167 There is "every reason" to imagine that Chevron had
similar impacts in other agencies, even though neither Elliott nor the
broader literature documents such.168
The "policy space" that Elliott describes is identical to Professor
Strauss's Chevron space, the range of reasonable-and-therefore-
permissible interpretations of an ambiguous statute.1 69 A statute, says
Strauss, "empower[s]" agencies with "authority" to select any
interpretation within its Chevron space.1 70 Elliott is saying that EPA
felt constrained only by policy when choosing among options in the
Chevron spaces defined by its statutes. This is exactly the approach
advocated by Professors Pierce and Foote, whose views are described
above.1 71 Pierce and Foote claim that agencies should be described
primarily as engaged in policymaking rather than statutory
interpretation, and in particular that agency decisions that would be
reviewed under Chevron step two (in Strauss's terms, a choice within a
multivocal Chevron space) are policy choices. The characterization of
these moves as policy decisions suggests that policy preferences are
their sole driver.
Professor John Willis, making a somewhat different argument
about Canada in the late 1960s, similarly implies that agency lawyers
should and do identify more strongly with the "social policy" of their
particular agency and less with the "legal policy" concerns of the
Canadian Attorney General. 172
More recently, the theory of deference as permission has been a
barely concealed subtext of expansive approaches to executive action
adopted by an Obama Administration frustrated by congressional
opposition and inaction. This practice has been both justified and
debated primarily in terms of the reach of the president's core
166. Elliott, supra note 161, at 12.
167. Id. at 3.
168. Sunstein, supra note 8, at 2599-2600.
169. Strauss, supra note 6, at 1143, 1160.
170. Id. at 1145.
171. See supra Part I.E.
172. Willis, supra note 140, at 354.
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constitutional "executive power" and the limits of his "prosecutorial
discretion."173 But executive action also often involves aggressive
statutory interpretation. In the gun control context, for example, the
President's frustration with congressional unwillingness to constrict
the easy the availability of firearms led him to instruct subordinates to,
in the words of a spokesman, "scrub existing legal authorities to see if
there's any additional action we can take administratively."' 174 Law
professor and blogger David Bernstein, acknowledging that Obama's
man probably meant to say "scour" rather than "scrub," notes the
statement as intended assumes a particular version of how to advise
the President regarding executive power: not to "first decide what's
lawful, and then give the president his options, [but] first seeing what
the president wants to do, and then scour[ing] legal authorities to find
some implausible but not crazy legal hook for his actions. 175
"Implausible but not crazy" is an imperfect but serviceable restatement
of this version of the Chevron step-two standard.
Finally, there is a formal literature on the practice of agency
interpretation. The models that this literature specifies consistently
assume that agencies maximize their preference in a policy space,
subject only to the external constraints of judicial review. 176 Professor
Matthew Stephenson's model of tradeoffs between formality of agency
procedure and interpretive flexibility, for example, proceeds on the
assumption that agencies are "interpretive instrumentalists, attaching
no intrinsic importance to textual fidelity or analogous concerns." 177 A
173. See U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1; United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.); Robert
J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration's Nonenforcement of
Immigration Laws, the DREAMAct, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784 (2013).
174. Jennifer Fermino & Larry McShane, Gun Control Regulations Likely a Part of President
Obama's New Year's Resolutions, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 31, 2015, 8:23 PM),
http://-ww.nydailynewcom/ncw/politico/obama-plans-announce-gun-control rcgulations 2016-
article- 1.2481810 [https://perma.cc/PL5Q-GHTQ] (quoting presidential spokesman Eric Shultz).
175. David Bernstein, Obama: "Scrub Existing Legal Authorities" to Take Executive Action on
Guns?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/01/0 1/obama-scrub-existing-legal-authorities-to-take-executive-action-on-
guns/ [https://perma.cc/2F3E-A5FD]. Bernstein's post credits earlier coverage by blogger and
professor Josh Blackman.
176. See, e.g., Yehonatan Givati, Strategic Statutory Interpretation by Administrative
Agencies, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 95, 96 (2010) ("In the model, the agency, which maximizes some
objective function, adopts a rule that interprets a statute . ,. ."); John R. Wright, Ambiguou3
Statutes and Judicial Deference to Federal Agencies, 22 J. THEORETICAL POL. 217 (2010). Wright
also models judicial behavior as maimizing an objectivc function dcfincd ovcr a policy 3pace,
Wright, supra, at 226.
177. See Stephenson, supra note 71, at 536, 544.
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given agency simply wants to "secure whatever interpretation would
best advance its substantive policy agenda."178
So too, in a model developed by Professor Yehonatan Givati,
agencies are motivated by a desire to maximize some output: an
environmental agency looks for the interpretation that will maximize
environmental protection, a tax agency for the interpretation that will
maximize government revenue, and a prosecutors' office for the one that
will maximize the number of cases. 179 Professor John Wright similarly
models agency decisions regarding the implementation of certain
statutes as ones where "the agency can essentially choose any rule and
corresponding policy outcome."180 Stephenson's model rests upon a
tension between a court's desire to secure its "own view of the best
reading of the statute" and its desire "to maximize the agency's ability
to advance its policy agenda."181 He calls the former the "textual
plausibility" of the statute, and says that when it is high relative to the
latter, this indicates a "more aggressively textualist" court.182 On the
other hand, Stephenson calls a court relatively more inclined to help an
agency secure its policy goals one that shows greater "intrinsic
deference" to the agency.18 3 (In other words, Stephenson models
nontextualism as a willingness to accept less good interpretations in
order to facilitate better policy.) It is courts that the modeling literature
generally casts in the role of caring about legal fidelity, or the "best"
meaning of the statute in a noninstrumental way, 184 as against policy-
driven agencies.
It is natural for modelers to think of players who maximize
utility subject to constraint. This is their basic professional instinct.
And of course they make no formal claim that actual institutions behave
as abstract ones do. Policy-maximization is an assumption.18 5
Stephenson even concedes that "[i]t is of course possible that some
agency personnel, particularly agency lawyers, may feel some intrinsic
obligation to respect the statutory text."186 But there is an unspoken
178. Id. at 535.
179. Givati, supra note 176, at 102 & n.5.
180. Wright, supra note 176, at 222.
181. See Stephenson, supra note 71, at 541.
182. See id. at 542.
183. See id.
184. Givati, supra note 176, at 96 (modeling courts as "nonstrategic" actors); Stephenson,
supra note 71, at 535.
185. Stephenson, supra note 71, at 535.
186. Id. at 535 n.22.
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claim that the modeling assumptions are at least plausible, that, in
Givati's words, the models can help explain "[h]ow administrative
agencies choose their statutory interpretation."' 18 7 The reason that these
models are of interest (and they are) is that their assumptions enjoy
some level of plausibility.
That models in which agencies feel free to maximize policy
preferences within their deference space are interesting and useful does
not imply that agencies do not have or are not thought to have ethical
constraints when they make their decisions. This is obvious when one
considers models of judicial behavior that treat courts as maximizing
their policy preferences subject to constraints.188 This in no way implies
that judges have no ethical constraints.18 9 Rather, the models are
helpful because they shed light upon a limiting case: they describe what
judges have the power to do, and what might happen were they to
exercise that power. That is different from saying what judges should
or even will do. The same is true for agencies.
To be sure, such models of judicial behavior do respond to a
suspicion that some judges, some of the time, do maximize policy
preferences.1 90 The agency models I describe here, I think, even more
strongly reflect a parallel suspicion. The models participate in an
assumption in our legal culture about agency freedom of action within
the deference space.
To know what an agency truly thinks about the ethics of
deference, much less what agencies in general think, is often not
possible. As I note in the Introduction, ethics are invisible. But it does
appear that many agencies often think that it is appropriate for them
to range freely across the deference space in order to achieve legitimate
policy goals.
187. See, e.g., Givati, supra note 176, at 95.
188. See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Judiciary and the Role of
Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 273, 274-77 (Barry R. Weingast & Donald A.
Wittman eds., 2006); MeNoIlGast, The Political Economy of Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 1651, § 7.1 at 1716-18 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) ("Scholars
of law and politics typically regard judicial decisions as subsequent to legislation. From this
perspective courtc are omnipotent actors, imposing any outcome thcy wish.").
189. See McNollGast, supra note 188, § 7.1, at 1716 (noting judicial preferences may flow from
"normative principles of law, moral philosophy, policy preferences or ideology"). In Stephenson's
model of policy driven agency interpretation, by contraot, he assumes that a rcvicwing "court, all
elso oqual, profers interpretations that correspond as closely as possible to its own view of the 'best'
reading of the statute." Stephenson, supra note 71, at 537. Judge Brett Kavanaugh similarly
asserts that "judges should strive to find the best reading of the statute." See Kavanaugh, supra
note 11, at 2144.
190. Stephenson, supra note 27, at 307--08.
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B. Deference as Abstention
A better understanding of deference is that it simply does not
speak to how agencies should select alternative readings of a statute
from within a deference space. It surely does not imply that all
alternatives within the space are equally valid. Rather, all that
deference does is assign the choice of alternatives to the agency, and
require judges not to second-guess that choice.
This is vivid from the language and structure of the major
deference cases. Part II of Chevron itself, in which the Court states the
famous two-step rule in general terms, begins straightforwardly: "When
a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions."191 These questions
confront the court, not the agency. Chevron describes its deferential
"stcp two" in this way: "A court may not substitutc ito own conotruction
of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency."192 This limits the court, not the agency.
Mead, similarly, frames its holding as defining the circumstances in
which a "reviewing court has no business rejecting an agency's exercise
of its generally conferred authority to resolve a particular statutory
ambiguity simply because the agency's chosen resolution seems
unwise."'193 This should not be read as an invitation to agencies actually
to be "unwise." To tolerate failure is not to equate failure with success.
This view is also essential to the arguments of scholars who
advocate agency attention to statutory purpose even when courts do not
and even perhaps should not engage in purposivist interpretation
themselves. 194  Such arguments assume that the process of
interpretation in an agency can and ought to be distinct from whatever
interpretive processes might be anticipated in a reviewing court.
Deference holdings are directed to the courts. They treat
methods of agency decisionmaking as exogenous.
There is some positive law about agency interpretation in
Chevron. Chevron and its sister deference cases of course rest upon the
APA idea that reviewing courts must set aside unreasonable agency
action. 195  This imposes (really, reiterates) a reasonableness
191. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
192. Id. at 844.
193. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
194. See supra notes 103-113 and accompanying text.
195. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012).
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requirement upon the agency. Chevron also says that "an agency to
which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may,
within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent
administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments." 196 This
tells agencies that they may permit at least some kind of policy-inflected
preferences to influence their decisions.
But to inform judgment is not the same as to direct judgment.
There is plenty of room to read this latter passage as approving of
purposive interpretation that is in line with the administration's sense
of congressional purpose. And, obviously, the rule that no agency
interpretation may be unreasonable does not imply that agencies may
promulgate any reasonable interpretation. There are neither formal nor
prudential reasons to imply from the propositions either that
unreasonable constructions will be set aside or that reasonable ones will
be upheld that the agency is itself entitled to promulgate any reasonable
interpretation.
C. The Paramount Duty of Fidelity to the Statute
The best understanding of deference is not just that it is agnostic
with respect to interpretation, but that it assumes that agencies have a
duty, independent of the courts, to interpret the statute as best they
can. A court must uphold the law, at least with respect to any matter
that it resolves.1 97 Therefore, it seems that a minimal prerequisite for a
court to defer to an interpretation promulgated by a non-judicial
authority is that the thing being deferred to itself be an interpretation.
The guiding intuition that underlies this view is that legal
grants of power, and legal restrictions upon that power, must be
understood as prior to the exercise of the power they delineate. This
intuition is at the root of Professor Bernstein's claim that "[o]ne would
hope.., that [Obama's] legal team would first decide what's lawful, and
then give the president his options, rather than first seeing what the
president wants to do, and then scour legal authorities to find some
implausible but not crazy legal hook for his actions."198 This same
intuition undergirds arguments, which proceed from politics very
196. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
197. Unlike the political question doctrine, for example, deference does not suggest that
challenger to agency intorprotations are situations in which courts have no prerogative to say what
the law is.
198. Bernstein, supra note 175.
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different from Bernstein's, that agency statutory interpretation is and
should be self-consciously purposivist. 199 These accounts emphasize
that agencies believe consideration of purpose to be the best way for
agencies to understand the intent of Congress. Such accounts
emphasize the agency of agencies. They subordinate agency preferences
to the effort to identify the meaning of legislation.
Professor Bernstein is wrong to insist that interpretation of the
law must be first in time, temporally prior to any view about what an
ideal policy outcome should be. 200 But interpretation should be
intellectually prior. Interpretation that is faithful to law must be a
process distinct from an effort simply to justify, however possible, an
already-determined desired legal outcome. To be sure, this is no easy
task; agencies are no different than the rest of us in their ability to
convince themselves that what they already want to do is, indeed, the
right thing to do. But they must bc on guard against such soclf deception.
Return to the image suggested by Professor Strauss, of the agency
lawyer with a policy agenda hard at work in a library of legislative
materials, seeking to understand whether her agenda accords with the
purpose of the statute as those materials define it.201 To interpret a
statute in good faith cannot be a process where one fires at a blank wall
and then draws a target around the point of impact.
This understanding does not view Chevron as merely a "magna
carta of deference, mandating greater respect for administrative
interpretations than had theretofore been the case." 20 2 It denies that
Chevron, properly read, "equivocates whether the agency's action was
'interpretation' strictu sensu or the implementation of a policy
judgment permitted by the statutory language."20 3 It privileges instead
the more particular and apt analogy that Chevron is a counter-
Marbury.20 4 Chevron holds, in Professor Sunstein's words, that "[i]n the
face of ambiguity, it is emphatically the province and duty of the
administrative department to say what the law is."205
199. See supra notes 103-113 and accompanying text.
200. Bernstein, supra note 175.
201. Strauss, supra note 14, at 330-31.
202. Merrill, Textualism, supra note 76, at 358.
203. Strauss, supra note 6, at 1163.
204. Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2637, 2637 (2003)
("Chevron... is routinely referred to as the 'counter-Marbury.' "); Foote, supra note 95, at 724.
205. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 189 (2006) (citing, for example,
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of
Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 301-03 (1988); Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in
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The view that the agency is saying what the law is necessarily
implies that the EPA, in the run-up to Chevron, was interpreting the
Clean Air Act and not merely "implement[ing] a policy judgment
permitted by the statutory language."206 The point of Chevron is not to
free the EPA and its sister agency from overweening judicial second-
guessing, as the barons were freed from the tyranny of King John.
Rather, it is to assign to the agency final responsibility to declare that
a contemporary Marbury has or lacks a particular legal entitlement.
The agency is therefore duty-bound to do so as best it can. Like a court
interpreting a statute nondeferentially (or without the benefit of any
agency interpretation), an agency is subject to legislative supremacy:
its mandate is to "say what the law is, not what the law should be."20 7
It must give force to the meaning it understands the statute to have.
This is only true, however, in situations where Sunstein's "in the
face of ambiguity" caveat applies. 208 Only when the courts defer does
the agency say what the law is.
The understanding is justified even more strongly from the
agency side. Statutes are the sine qua non-that without which there
is nothing-for agencies. Agencies exist as pure creatures of their
statutes. 20 9 As Professor Miller argued in 1987, one cannot ethically
even assist an agency in acting if it cannot claim statutory authority,
"since without statutory authority there is ... no bona fide claim of
constitutional power to act. ' 210 Statutes are what create agencies'
duties.211 When agencies interpret a statute with finality, therefore,
fidelity to statutory meaning must override policy, adherence to a
political agenda, or considerations of the public good. Without fidelity
to the statute, agency power is ultra vires and illegitimate.
This approach is broadly consistent with the view of other
scholars who have considered agencies' duties with respect to their
statutes in our system of agency law. Professor Stack, for example, also
emphasizes that the "most basic feature of a regulatory statute is the
the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 283-84 (1986)); see also Monaghan, supra note 3, at
5 (anticipating this issue before Chevron); Sunstein, supra note 8, at 2580, 2583 84, 2588.
206. Strauss, supra note 6, at 1163.
207. Kavanaugh, supra note 11, at 2119, 2120. As Kavanaugh notes repeatedly, this is "not
always easy." Id. at 2121, 2145.
208. Sunstein, supra note 205, at 189.
209. Jeffrey Rosenthal, Who is the Client of the Government Lawyer?, in ETHICAL STANDARDS
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, supra note 30, at 17, 18.
210. Miller, supra note 54, at 1297.
211. Stack, supra note 14, at 888.
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vesting of lawmaking and other powers in the agency. An agency
'literally [has] no power to act ... unless and until Congress confers
power upon it.' "212 As noted, Stack goes further and claims that
agencies under many regulatory statutes bear duties with respect to the
particular method of interpretation. 213 For reasons described above, I
am unready to call this additional duty a matter of agency ethics in
role. 21 4 But Stack is right that the analysis of duty begins with the
source of agency power.
Professor Criddle similarly begins from the position that
agencies' duties flow from their authorizing statutes. "At its heart," he
writes, "administrative law governs the exercise of entrusted authority
by institutions that serve as stewards for the people. The terms of an
administrative agency's enabling statuLe reflect Lhe Lype and degree of
trust that the people, through their elected representatives, have
chosen to repose in the agency."21 5 This is exactly right. But I reason
more narrowly from this proposition than Criddle. Criddle thinks that
this proposition creates a general duty, by which "administrative
agencies' fiduciary obligations do not run solely to the chief executive or
the legislature per se, but rather to the agencies' statutory beneficiaries,
who are often, but not always, the sovereign people as a whole. '216 Such
duties, in my view, must be limited by the meaning of the "terms of the
enabling statute." Some statutes surely permit consideration of a
generalized public interest; but that is a particular interpretive
conclusion about a particular statute. Such a conclusion must be
logically and ethically prior to the acceptance of any such duty.
When agencies are extended deference, therefore, they do not
gain carte blanche to use interpretation as a tool to achieve desired
ends. They must instead interpret in good faith. This is unlike the
responsibilities, say, of a private citizen, who is entitled to pick the
interpretation of an unclear legal requirement that she likes the best
and act accordingly, aware that eventually some authoritative
decisionmaker may determine the proper interpretation for itself in a
way that then would become binding upon her and upon others.
212. Id. (quoting La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986)).
213. Id. at 888-89.
214. See supra Part I.B.
215. Criddle, supra note 48, at 136.
216. Id. at 139.
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It is also very unlike the ethical directive to federal prosecutors
to "do justice" when enforcing the law. 217 This is because agencies are
diametrically different than prosecutors. They have different
institutional roles. Prosecution is an inherent and foundational part of
the executive function, separate by its nature from the business of
lawmaking. 218 Agencies, by contrast, are entirely animated by their
statutes.219 They should understand their duty not as seeking the
generalized public good but as maintaining fidelity to their statutes.
Dean John Feerick, speaking generally about public-sector
ethics, cites the "Athenian Oath."220 The text of this oath as it has come
down to us refers to a duty to "revere and obey the city's laws and do
our best to incite to a like respect and reverence those who are prone to
annul or set them at naught." Feerick asserts that this "captures all the
ideals of public office as a public trust. '221 With respect to agencies, at
least, he is right. Respect for the law is their first duty. Policy comes
second.
III. IMPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
A. Consistency and Precedent
When an agency construes a statute, it says what the law is.
Agencies therefore must respect the jurisprudential (better,
"regleprudential") values that accompany law declaration, although
this respect can take a different form that it does in courts. 222 Among
the most important such values are consistency, predictability, and
respect for precedent.
Citizens might expect two kinds of consistency from agencies
with respect to statutory interpretation. One is intra-agency
consistency: an agency (within a particular agency head's term or, in
the case of independent regulatory bodies, between each incident of
member turnover) should perhaps use a consistent interpretive
methodology for all of its decisions. The other is inter-agency
217. See supra Part I.B.
218. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689 (1988); see also id. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(stating that prosocution "[is] conducted never by the lcgislature, nccr by the courts, and always
by the executive").
219. Whether agencies share criminal prosecutors' ethical duty to do justice when they
oxerciro their own inveotigativo and prosecutorial functions is discussod infra Part III.D.
220. Feerick, supra note 30, at 2-3.
221. Id.
222. See Davidson & Leib, supra note 15, at 270-71; Morrison, supra note 155, at 1493-97.
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consistency: perhaps the President should attempt to harmonize
methods of statutory interpretation across the agencies, or at least all
line agencies within his administration, rather than leave the
jurisprudential theories of interpretation to the preferences of each
individual agency. Can the same President have a textualist EPA but a
purposivist OSHA? Or should voters be asked to decide whether they
prefer a textualist administration or a purposivist one? (One should not
pretend that either a shorthand label or a lengthy exposition of
interpretive principles would find universal acquiescence throughout
the government, resolve all questions, or induce uniformity among
agencies.)
These questions, especially the latter one, have important
theoretical implications relating to lines of authority in the
administrative state. In practice, however, they are moot. An agency or
a president who wants to vary methods of interpretation, and has
public-regarding reasons for doing so, is saying that she thinks that one
method fits a given statutory problem or policy situation or regulatory
field better than another. But this is not really switching methods.
Rather, such an agency is consistently implementing the method of
interpretive pragmatism. As Judge Wald has written:
For most of our history, American judges have been pragmatists when it comes to
interpreting statutes. They have drawn on various conventions-the plain meaning rule,
legislative history, considerations of statutory purpose, canons of construction "much as
a golfer selects the proper club when he gauges the distance to the pin and the contours
of the course." 223
One can therefore hardly object to interpretive pragmatism, within or
among agencies, as inconsistent.
This does not imply that an agency could not declare a consistent
commitment to a particular interpretive method. Similarly, a president
might commit to a particular method of reading statutes, say so
publicly, and seek to induce agencies to adopt that method. 224 It is
particularly easy to imagine in our current political climate a stated
commitment to textualism by an agency or an entire administration.
But departures from a preferred interpretive method in a given case,
whether a single action or a particular agency, are not problematic
223. Wald, supra note 97, at 215-16 (1983) (quoting a conversation with Judge Leventhal);
see also Merrill, Textualism, supra note 76, at 351.
221. Whether a President could require agencies to be toxtualist dopendo on whether he
enjoys direct authority over agency decisions; this is the subject of substantial debate. See supra
note 153. It is clear that many scholars would argue strenuously that a President should not, for
reasons of policy, seek such a requirement. See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
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because they are inconsistent. If such departures are problematic at all,
it is because the relevant interpreter opposes pragmatic interpretation.
Presidents and agencies are ethically entitled to be as pragmatic or
dogmatic as they choose.
Respect for precedent is a related value, especially when agency
decisions, like courts', are adjudicatory in nature. How are agencies'
duties to assign a statute its best reading affected if there is a prior,
mthoritative statement of what the statute means?
Two situations must be distinguished. The first: An agency in
the past interpreted the statute one way; today's agency, were it
deciding de novo, would not agree that this is the best interpretation.
Should the agency discard the prior interpretation, or may it properly
accept what it now views as second-best interpretation in order to
conform to its own precedent?
This scenario imagines facts similar to those presented by a 2009
case decided by the Supreme Court, Federal Communications
Commission v. Fox Television.225 In a series of successive decisions
spanning decades, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")
had repeatedly changed its mind regarding whether evanescent
utterances of vulgar terms on television violated the statutory
requirement that holders of broadcast licenses not "utter[ ] any obscene,
indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication .... "226
In its most recent flip-flop, the Commission had imposed liability on
several networks for broadcasting such "fleeting expletives."227 Those
penalized asked the Supreme Court to impose a more stringent variety
of arbitrary and capricious review when an agency had reversed its own
precedent than would have been imposed had the agency reached the
same decision as a matter of first impression. 228 But the Supreme Court
declined to do so. The Administrative Procedure Act and the Court's
precedents, it said, "mak[e] no distinction.., between initial agency
action and subsequent agency action undoing or revising that action."229
Fox TV is not our case. It concerns judicial review rather than
agency deliberation, and was framed entirely as a question of arbitrary
and capricious review, never even mentioning Chevron deference. But
the Fox TV scenario allows us to ask whether the FCC in 2004, if it in
fact believed that the statutory phrase "obscene, indecent, or profane
225. 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
226. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006); discussed in Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 506.
227. Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 510-12.
228. Id. at 514.
229. Id. at 515.
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language" was best understood to embrace fleeting expletives, would
nevertheless have been ethically entitled, had it wished to do so, to
adjudicate the case using prior precedent. More plausibly, perhaps, one
might ask whether an Obama-era FCC could have left the more
stringent fleeting expletive prohibition in place even if, had it been
writing on a clean slate, it would have thought that the statute did not
reach offhand, momentary profanity.
This is a hard question because respect for precedent is a
category of reason that is neither about statutory interpretation nor
about policy. Rather, it is a process value. It is unhelpful, I think, to
resolve it simply by insisting upon the formulation that statutory
fidelity is a primary, even paramount value for agencies, and so
precedent should fall before it. Statutory fidelity is also such a value for
courts, yet the courts give special weight to stare decisis in statutory
interpretation cases. 23°
On the other hand, it is unsatisfying simply to import the
judicial principle of strong statutory stare decisis into the agency
context. There are good normative reasons to challenge the principle,23
1
and good data suggesting that the principle itself is someLimes honored
in the breach.23 2 Moreover, one justification for strong statutory stare
decisis in the courts is the separation of powers: it serves to limit
judicial policymaking in the guise of ever-shifting interpretation.233 In
this respect, agencies are situated differently from courts. Their
institutions are explicitly intended to make policy and to shift in their
policy views with evolving circumstances and the political winds.
234
Ultimately, I think, agency respect for precedent must be a
matter of degree. A precedent today's agency thinks entirely
wrongheaded should be rejected, but one that is just a bit off could, even
should, ethically be tolerated. Today's agency is also entitled to consider
what it know-, about whether yesterday's agency behaved ethically, that
230. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989).
231. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1385
(1988).
232. Id. at 1368-69; Lawrence C. Marshall, 'Let Congress Do It" The Case for an Absolute
Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 182 & n.36 (1989) (collecting cases).
233. Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 317, 323-27 (2005); Marshall, supra note 232, at 208-11.
234. Marshall, supra note 232 at 224 25. The literature on this topic would benefit from a
more thorough apprcciation that statutory interpretation does not involve only the Congress and
the courts, but also involves agencies, both as authoritative interpreters of statutes and as
institutions with quasi-legislative powers.
20161 1279
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
is, whether it had selected what it genuinely and public-regardingly
thought was the best interpretation.
The other species of potentially relevant precedent is judicial. In
the companion cases of National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v.
Brand X 235 and United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, 2 36 the
Supreme Court considered whether agencies may promulgate
interpretations inconsistent with constructions already blessed by an
authoritative court. In Brand X, the Court held that agencies could do
so, if the court had merely deferred to a reasonable agency
interpretation under Chevron.237 But, Home Concrete reiterated
explicitly, agencies are bound by judicial interpretations issued with the
understanding that there was no interpretive gap that the agency had
been delegated to fill.238
These are Chevron issues. For our purposes, the Home Concrete
decision is trivial: courts limn the boundaries of the Chevron space, and
even an agency that disagrees can and should accept the judicial map,
prospectively and certainly retrospectively. 239 But the Brand X scenario
is a puzzler: the agency thinks that the best interpretation is B, but the
court has already deferred to a prior interpretation C. Brand X holds
that the agency may promulgate B notwithstanding; but the ethical
question is whether the agency must as an ethical matter in this
circumstance promulgate B, or whether it has ethical warrant to stick
with C even though it judges it to be interpretively inferior.
The Brand X problem shares with its Fox TV analogue its
jurisprudential (better, "regleprudential") value of respect for precedent
and its concomitant benefits: order, reliance, and respect for the law.
Those benefits can be as compelling in the former situation as the latter,
But the Brand X scenario differs from that of Fox TV in two relevant
ways. First, there is a confusion of institutions. In the Fox TV scenario,
an agency gives up what it views as the best interpretation of a statute
in favor of an interpretation that a prior incarnation of the agency itself
once viewed as the best. In the Brand X scenario, no agency has ever
necessarily offered a best reading of the statute. For the agency to
accept the judicial reading is therefore to cede agency authority to say
what the law is to the courts. Moreover, on the Brand X facts, the court
never says that the interpretation it confirmed was in fact the best
235. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
236. 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
237. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982.
238. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1843.
239. Accord Miller, supra note 54, at 1298.
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interpretation; it said only that it was a permissible interpretation of
an ambiguous statute. Therefore, no authoritative decisionmaker has
ever identified the best interpretation. Both of these differences, it
seems to me, make the Brand X situation less unclear than the Fox TV
situation, and counsel in favor of an agency indeed having a duty to
promulgate B-the interpretation that it thinks best.
B. When Agencies Face Skidmore Deference
In Skidmore v. Swift, a pre-Chevron case, the Supreme Court
said that agency interpretations of a statutory term that were "not
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority" could "still
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts
and litigants may properly resort for guidance. ' 240 "The weight of such
a judgment in a particular case," Skidmore continued, "will depend
upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control. '241
In recent times, the Supreme Court revitalized Skidmore by
declaring, in Mead, that Skidmore is the relevant standard for
reviewing many agency interpretations promulgated with procedures
more informal than the notice-and-comment procedures defined by the
Administrative Procedure Act.242
Given that I have argued for a duty borne by agencies only when
they are subject to judicial deference, does that duty apply to agencies
that will receive deference under Skidmore or its analogues? That
depends on whether Skidmore is really deference. If it is, then agencies
retain their duty. If not, as I argue in Part I.C, they are entitled to
ignore their own best judgment and instead anticipate the courts.
Skidmore is certainly not deference in the way Chevron is.
Under Chevron, agency interpretations receive deference because they
are made by the agency. They are "controlling upon the courts by reason
of their authority. '243 At the same time, there are other senses of the
term "deference" under which Skidmore clearly qualifies. 244 Skidmore
240. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
241. Id.
242. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001).
243. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
244. Monaghan, supra note 3, at 5.
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does involve deference, for example, in the view of Professors Jonathan
Masur and Lisa Ouellette, who recently defined deference "to include
any situation in which a second decisionmaker is influenced by the
judgment of some initial decisionmaker rather than examining an issue
entirely de novo. ' '245
For the purposes of the agency obligation to interpret, the
question is whether Skidmore is the sort of deference that requires a
court, in some situations, to endorse a statutory construction that it
does not view as the best available. 246 This is the sense of deference that
makes the agency into an authoritative interpreter of its statute, which
in turn is what triggers its ethical obligation to adopt the best
interpretation it thinks will survive review. 247 Absent final interpretive
authority, the agency is entitled simply to anticipate the construction
that it expects the reviewing court to adopt.
But it is doubtful that Skidmore in fact involves deference in this
sense. Mead settles only that the Court describes Skidmore review as
"deference," 248 not whether it is deference of this sort. Given that
Skidmore says that agencies are due its deference only to the extent
that the agency's views have the "power to persuade," some, Justice
Scalia chief among them, would insist that it is not "deference" in the
relevant way.249 But many judges and commentators understand
Skidmore to involve, in some cases, a court agreeing with the agency
without having been convinced. Professors Thomas Merrill and Kristin
Hickman call it "an intermediate option" that "rescues courts from a
stark choice between Chevron deference or no deference at all."250
245. Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
643, 652 (2015).
246. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text; Monaghan, supra note 3, at 5 ("Deference,
to be meaningful, imports agency displacement of what might have been the judicial view res
nova in short, administrative displacement of judicial judgment.").
247. Monaghan, supra note 3, at 6 ("A statement that judicial deference is mandated to an
administrative 'intorprotation' of a statute is morc appropriatcly undcrstood as a judicial
conclusion that somo subotantivo law making authority hao been conferred upon the agency.").
248. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 ("Chevron did nothing to eliminate
Shidmorc'G holding that an agency's interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form.").
249. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to "so-called Skidmore deference"); see Kristin
E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 1235, 1252-55 (2007) (describing the "independent judgment model of Skidmore review").
250. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836
(2001); accord Hickman & Krueger, supra note 249, at 1241 & n.22 (2007); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Democratizing the Administrative State, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 559, 568-69 (2006) (describing
Skidmoy e deference as a "wedaket dd more contingent type of deference" than that assuciated with
Chevron).
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Professor Eskridge and his collaborator call it "mildly deferential," "a
judicial willingness to go along. 2 51 Professor Strauss, who advocates
the term "Skidmore weight," says that under Skidmore courts retain
their independent judgment but give weight to agency opinions because
they are often more informed, more uniform, more predictable, more
experienced, and generally more savvy than courts' own. 252
Resolving this question is beyond the scope of this Article. Which
view is right determines the ethics of interpretation in the shadow of
Skidmore deference. If courts defer under Skidmore to agency
interpretations they think are interpretively suboptimal, then agencies
are saying what the law is and must promulgate the interpretation they
think is interpretively the best. If courts will not accept interpretations
with which they do not agree, agencies are both entitled and usually
wise to privilege the courts' anticipated interpretation over their own
best interpretation of the statute.
C. Agencies Interpreting Their Own Regulations
Another genus of deference is that accorded to agencies when
they resolve ambiguities in their own regulations. In the classic case of
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 253 and then again in Auer v.
Robbins,254 the Supreme Court instructed courts to defer to agency
interpretations of agencies' own regulations whenever those
interpretations are not "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation. '255 The Court limits such "Auer deference" to situations
where there is no reason to suspect that the agency's interpretation
"does not reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment on the
matter in question."256 But if the agency is acting in good faith, Auer is
to ambiguous regulations as Chevron is to ambiguous statutes, 257 except
251. Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An
Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727,
1737, 1744 (2010).
252. Strauss, supra note 6, at 1146.
253. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
254. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
255. Id. at 461.
256. Id. at 462.
257. See Coeur Alaska v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 277-78 (2009); John
F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agcncy Intcrprctations of Agcncy
Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 613 (1996) ('The Chevron and Seminole Rock principles.., are
functionally similar.").
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that its "plainly erroneous" standard is even more deferential-in the
hands of the Court, much more deferential-than Chevron's
reasonableness standard. 258
Three sitting justices of the Supreme Court, along with the late
Justice Scalia, have recently indicated-some of them repeatedly-that
they are open to overruling Auer. 259 They express two primary concerns.
The first, based upon separation of powers, is that legally binding text
should not be promulgated and interpreted by the same agency. 260
Chevron deference respects this principle because the Congress
legislates and the agencies interpret. But Auer does not, because
agencies first promulgate rules and then, by the operation of deference,
function as authoritative interpreters of those same rules.26 1
A second problem is more practical. Auer encourages, rather
than discourages, ambiguity in rulemaking. If agencies know that
courts will defer to any interpretation of a regulation not "plainly
erroneous," they will draft regulations in ways that maximize
ambiguity, in order to be able to operate in as expansive a deference
space as possible. 26 2
258. Richard J. Pierce, Jr. & Joshua Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial Review of Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 516 & n.8 (2011) (finding the Court is
"extraordinarily deferential" to agency intcrpretations of their own rules, and the courts of appeals
somewhat lesss o (citing Eskridge & Baer, supra note 4, at 1142 & tbl. 15)).
259. See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Bryana Bible, 136 S. Ct. 1607, slip op. at 2 (2016)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct.
1199, 1213 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339
(2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1338 (Roberts,
C.J., concurring) (Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, expressing general agreement with
Justice Scalia's disapproval of Auer but disagreeing that Decker was an appropriate vehicle
through which to overrule the case). Professor Manning points out that other justices can also be
understood to have endorsed some or all of these concerns. Sc Manning, supra note 257, at 615
(discussing Justice Thomas's dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, and O'Connor, in
ThomaG Jefferson Univ, v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 518 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
The Congress also occasionally seeks explicitly specifically to overrule Auer. At this writing,
the most recent attempt is H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. § 2(c) (2016) (proposing to amend the
Adminiotrative Procedure Act to provide that court- should "decide de novo all relevant questions
of law, including the interpretation of rifles made by sgencies"). Enactment is highly unlikely
260. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1340 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Manning,
v7ipro note 9"17, qt A54 ("Given the reolity tht agercies engage in 'lawmaking' when they exerciseo
rulemaking authority, Seminole Rock contradicts the constitutional premise that lawmaking and
law-exposition must be distinct.").
261. Manning, supra note 257, at 654.
262. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1340 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United
Student Aid Funds, 136 S Ct. 1607, slip op. at 2 (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari); Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock's Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1449, 1460-62 (2010).
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Both of these concerns are rooted in the recognition that an
agency to whose interpretations courts defer is authoritatively
declaring what the law means. Justice Scalia's objections to Auer lead
to one of the most direct acknowledgements in the United States
Reports of Professor Monaghan's and Professor Sunstein's deference-
as-Marbury claim: 263
Making regulatory programs effective is the purpose of rulemaking, in which the agency
uses its "special expertise" to formulate the best rule. But the purpose of interpretation is
to determine the fair meaning of the rule-to "say what the law is," Marbury v. Madison,
1 Cranch 137 [ ] (1803). Not to make policy, but to determine what policy has been made
and promulgated by the agency, to which the public owes obedience. 264
Justice Scalia is clear here not only that agencies say what the law is,
but that doing so involves a duty to interpret and "[n]ot to make
policy."265
Were agencies to acknowledge a duty, when interpreting their
own regulations, "not to make policy" but only to interpret, the concerns
about the Auer doctrine that the Justices have expressed would be
ameliorated, though not rectified. Agencies that scrupulously hewed to
what they viewed as the best interpretation of an agency rule,
regardless of their policy preferences, would have relatively little
incentive to promulgate ambiguous rules that were purposely
ambiguous. Even faithful purposivist interpretation would not allow
agencies the free rein that Justice Scalia and his colleagues fear.
This does not solve the Auer problem; the separation of powers
claim that interpretation and promulgation must be separate remains.
But, as even Justice Scalia recognizes, deference is a compromise. 266 If
there were a broad consensus that deference to agencies interpreting
their own rules was not permission for agencies to act however they
thought best, but demanded agency interpretation, that compromise
might be more palatable.
263. Monaghan, supra note 3, at 25.
264. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1340 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
265. Id.
260. Se id. at 1311 ("Aucr dcference has the samc beneficial pragmatic effect as Chevron
deference! The country need not endure the uncertainty produced by divergent views of numerous
district courts and courts of appeals as to what is the fairest reading of the regulation, until a
definitive answer is finally provided, years later, by this Court."); Pierce & Weiss, supra note 258,
at 519; Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 262, at 1459.
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D. Agencies Exercising Their
Investigative and Prosecutorial Functions
Agencies routinely monitor the conduct of regulated entities,
investigate alleged misconduct, and prosecute violations internally
before agency tribunals. These activities perforce involve statutory
interpretation. To investigate or prosecute the violation of a statute or
regulation requires a judgment about what the statute or regulation
means.
Consider, then, a statute that prohibits a range of behaviors and
authorizes the agency to enforce that prohibition; but the scope of the
statutory prohibition is ambiguous. We have established that a
conscientious agency is obliged to conform its deference-worthy
rulemakings and adjudicative decisions to what it regards as the best
interpretation of that statute. But must it similarly conform its
monitoring, investigative, and prosecutorial functions to that same,
best interpretation? Or, could the agency investigate and prosecute
activity not prohibited by the statute as the agency best understands it,
but that would be prohibited under a competing, reasonable, but
suboptimal interpretation of the statute? An agency might want to do
this, if it were permissible. Investigation and prosecution could deter
conduct that the agency wants to prevent as a policy matter-
notwithstanding that, were the matter to come to a final adjudicative
decision, the agency could not hold that it was forbidden.
The converse case, with somewhat different implications, would
involve an agency whose best interpretation of a statute prohibits a
wide range of conduct, but which had a policy preference for a narrower
interpretation that is both reasonable and, from the agency point of
view, interpretively suboptimal. Could such an agency direct its
investigators and prosecutors to exercise discretion and ignore conduct
that, under what it views as the best interpretation of a statute, is
prohibited?
Assessing this problem demands a comparison between the
adjudicative and rulemaking functions on the one hand, and
monitoring, investigation, and prosecution on the other. The most
obvious difference between the two sets of roles, of course, is that the
latter group does not involve "final" agency action.267 Monitoring,
investigation, and prosecution are generally not subject to judicial
267. 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (2012).
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review at all.26 8 They are certainly not candidates for judicial deference,
even of the Skidmore variety. If a final agency action that will not
receive judicial deference need not conform to the best interpretation of
the statute-as I have argued 269-then it seems that a fortiori an agency
need not conform its non-final activities, which receive no deference
whatsoever, to that interpretation.
At the same time, monitoring, investigation, and prosecution
involve interpretive discretion much like that associated with
rulemaking and adjudication. Moreover, these functions are part of a
single process that culminates in adjudication. The modal (though not
universal) practice is for a single agency simultaneously to monitor,
investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate.270 An agency interpretation that
leads it to investigate or prosecute some kinds of activity but not others
has enormous consequences for the regulated public. Investigation and
prosecution are the engines of adjudication. They determine what
questions are heard and what interpretations are considered. And
prosecutors themselves, in an important sense, are adjudicators; in
particular, a case never prosecuted will never be adjudicated.27 1
Investigation and prosecution are thus central parts of an agency's law
declaration function.
To be sure, the Administrative Procedure Act, concerned about
the combination of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions, imposes
upon agencies an internal "separation of functions" that prohibits
collusion and most communication between agency officials involved in
the two sets of activities. 272 This separation, however, is imperfect. It
does not apply before adjudicative proceedings begin. It applies only to
formal adjudication, with no parallel provisions for rulemaking or
268. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012); David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV.
1155, 1159 (2016) ("Agencies have always enjoyed unfettered discretion to choose their
enforcement targets").
269. See supra Part I.C.
270. See Michael Asimow, The Administrative Judiciary: ALJ's in Historical Perspective, 20
J. NAT'L ASSN ADMIN. L. JUDGES 157, 157-58 (2000).
271. See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 871 (2009).
272. Scc 5 U.S.C. § 551(d) (2012); Kcvin M. Stack, Agency Independence After PCAOB, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 2391, 2398 (2011). This design is sometimes referred to as the "internal
secparation of powers" within agencies. It is conceptually clearer, however, to distinguish tho two
terms, treating the latter as a broader category. Stack, supra, at 2395 n.10 (citing Gillian E.
Mvteger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and Extcrnal Separation of Powers,
59 EMORY L.J. 423, 429-34, 453-57 (2009)).
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informal adjudication. 273 The separation of functions also breaks down,
of necessity, when the head of an agency, by definition the supervisor of
investigators and prosecutors in her agency's employ, conducts
adjudications herself.274 In that circumstance, the same individual is
perforce involved in investigation, prosecution, and monitoring. Can
that single individual, ethically obliged when adjudicating to conform
to what she determines to be the best interpretation of the statute,
simultaneously direct prosecutors and investigators to hew to a
different, though still reasonable, interpretation?
The matter is further complicated by the nature and processes
of investigation and prosecution, which are focused on the development
of factual records and, in their nature, are often adversarial. An agency
might arrive at its view of a best interpretation because its opinions are
sharpened by an adversarial, intra-agency prosecution; indeed, it might
come to change its view of what is the best interpretation because of
such a prosecution, To require investigators and prosecutors to hew to
the existing agency interpretation might be to ossify agency
interpretation and prevent access to facts and opinions that should
inform it.
An important additional set of concerns is raised by the ethical
duty of prosecutors, in particular, to "seek justice."275 There are strong
reasons to think that intra-agency prosecutors, just as criminal
prosecutors, bear such duties. Professor Bruce Green has been the
preeminent proponent of the claim that civil lawyers representing the
government-a somewhat broader category than agency litigators-
must seek justice. 276 Green understands this to be a consequence of
their "dual role as lawyer for the government and government
official." 277 Supporting Green's normative claims is the practical reality
273. See Michael Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in the Federal
Administrative Agencies, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 759, 760 (1981). Asimow notes that some agencies
separate fn ctions even when such separation is not statutorily requirod. Sve id.
274. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(C); Asimow, supra note 273, at 765-68. This rule is the same for
agencies headed by single persons and by bodies of several commissioners.
275. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
276. Bruce A. Green, Must Government Lawyers "Seek Justice" in Civil Litigation?, 9
WIDENER J. PuB. L. 235, 239 (2000).
277. Id. at 265-66. But see Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics
uf thp Fedtal Gouernment Lawyer:. The Putt Iu, dtot Quastiunb, 64 9. CAL. L. REV. 951, 1013-17
(1991) (stating civil government lawyers have no special justice seeking duties beyond those that
apply to all attorneys). It should be noted that the line between criminal and civil proceedings is
permeable. To be sure, agency prosecutions rarely involve criminal ponalties, but when they do,
these cases require the involvement of non agency prosecutors, who bcar indcpcndcnt duties to
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that agency prosecutors, like their criminal counterparts, wield
unusually vast powers as representatives of the sovereign. 278 Both sorts
of prosecutors also adopt an adversarial posture with respect to their
opposing parties;279 both enjoy very substantial discretion; and both can
use that discretion to disrupt, upend, and even destroy lives and
livelihoods. 28 0
These considerations push one to want agency prosecutors, like
their criminal counterparts, to seek justice. But if justice-seeking is a
duty that agency prosecutors bear, in some circumstances it will come
into conflict with the view that agency prosecution must hew to the best
interpretation of a statute. The best reading from an interpretive
perspective might not be the reading that best advances justice.
One easy solution to this conflict is to exercise prosecutorial
discretion, but to do so only within the constraints of the agency's best
interpretation. So, in the case where an agency thinks the statute,
assigned its best reading, prohibits a range of behaviors, it would be
entirely legitimate to direct investigators and prosecutors to give
attention only to a subset of those behaviors. This is garden-variety
investigative and prosecutorial discretion. It need not be conceptualized
as giving the statute a suboptimal reading at all. An agency might have
a range of motives for proceeding in this way, including justice-seeking.
Discretion can of course be abused, and at the margins there will be
gray areas.281
seek justice, and eventual determination by a court. See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and
Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and Courts, 94 GEO. L.J. 1, 5-6 (2005) (noting that the
"modern federal regulatory state [is] fo,.ndede on virri] penalties, pnitivi damages, and delegation
of prosecutorial authority to administrative agencies and private parties"); Laura J. Kerrigan et
al., Project: 7The Decritninalizatib uf Adinistrative Law PtnItit.3, Civil R16yacdic, Alternatiu"s,
Policy, and Constitutional Implications, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 367, 369, 419, 426 & nn.473-80 (1993)
(documenting trend away from criminal sanctions for regulatory offens, but noting the
"commingling of administrative and criminal law power" in agency Offices of Inspector General
and giving examples of "federal legislation authorizing parallel administrative and criminal
procccdings"). Agency and criminal prosecutors also cooperate and, even absent active cooperation,
assist one anothcr in developing facts and evidence. See generally Shiv Narayan Peroaud, Parallel
Investigations Between Adminiotrative and Law Enforcement Agencies: A Quction of Civil
Liberties, 39 U. DAYTON L. REV. 77 (2013).
278. Green, supra note 58, at 632-33.
279. Zacharias, supra note 64, at 53 (suggesting a connection between this adversarial posture
and prosecutors' duty to seek justice).
280. See KENNETH F. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 520-21 (4th
ed. 2004).
281. See, e.g., United States v. Texas 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.); Texas v. United States,
809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015).
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This does not resolve, however, the difficult question: If an
agency preference conflicts with what it understands to be the best
interpretation of a statute, may it direct its prosecutors and
investigators to pursue suboptimal, but still reasonable, interpretations
for policy reasons? With respect to prosecutors, must the agency do so if
it believes those interpretively suboptimal readings to be justice-
seeking? It would, of course, then be obligated to impose the
interpretively optimal reading were it required to make an adjudicative
decision that would induce judicial deference. But this outcome is not a
certainty: many cases never get that far.
Ultimately, in such circumstances, an agency must investigate
and prosecute only in ways consistent with its best interpretation of the
statute. In the context of adjudication and rulemaking, this duty is
triggered by judicial deference, which gives the agency discretion that,
within a range of reasonableness, is not subject to further review. When
they investigate and prosecute, agencies exercise discretion that is
similarly unreviewable. This duty, therefore, should apply even in
circumstances where the ultimate agency decision is reviewable and
does not receive deference-because investigative and prosecutorial
discretion is not itself reviewable. It should also apply to cases unlikely
to be resolved through final agency action of any kind. Although it is
true that investigations and prosecutions might generate change in
agencies' opinions about what the best interpretation is, once such an
interpretation is determined, change must come through a process of
intra-agency consultation and argument, not through adversarial
proceedings.
This view is consistent with Green's suggestion that the duty of
the civil government lawyer to seek justice is a manifestation of her
"constitutional duty to faithfully carry out the law" and to avoid
"seeking outcomes or employing methods that, in the lawyer's
independent professional judgment, are contrary to the law."28 2 Unlike
criminal prosecutors, who are separately elected or selected with an
independent mandate to seek justice, agencies-including prosecutors
within those agencies-are creatures of their statutes. When they
exercise discretionary functions not subject to outside review, they
should do so only in ways consistent with their best understanding of
what the law requires. Policy preferences, and any justice-seeking duty
borne by agency prosecutors, must be subordinate to agency duty to
interpret the statute as best it can. Agency prosecutors may collaborate
282. Green, supra note 276, at 276.
1290 [Vol. 69:5:1231
AGENCIES' OBLIGATION TO INTERPRET
with outside prosecutors, who have their own, different duties; but their
own responsibility to the statute is paramount.
E. Interpretation and the Law Governing Lawyers
The ethical obligations of a lawyer who works for an agency are
the subject of a small but interesting literature. The most persuasive
position in that literature is that such a lawyer represents her own
particular agency, not the government writ large or the public in
general. As Professors Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller explain:
[T]he scope of a government attorney's ethical duties must be understood in the context
of the attorney's role in a system of separation of powers. It is not the responsibility of an
agency attorney to represent the "public interest" nor the government as a whole. Rather,
the constitutional system of checks and balances depends upon the institutional loyalty
of its attorneys. Although this argument runs counter to the common intuition that the
government attorney should act to further the common good, we argue that this common
view is ultimately insupportable, in large part because there is simply no consensus in
our pluralistic society as to what constitutes the common good.
2 8 3
An agency lawyer owes her agency duties to provide sound advice and
zealous representation when requested, although she may not assist it
in clearly unlawful activity.
There is no reason to alter this conclusion in the context of
statutory interpretation. So, to take an example offered by Miller, an
agency lawyer should not assist her agency in promulgating a rule or
adjudication that interprets a statute in a manner contrary to that
announced in a court decision in which the agency was a party.28 4 (Even
then, she should first work within the agency to forestall such
283. Jonathan R. Maccy & Ccoffroy P. Miller, Reflections on Professional Responsibility in a
Regulatory State, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (1995); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 97(2) cmt. c (2000); Green, supra note 58, at 636-37, 627 n.84
("Lawycrs reprcsenting the government in civil proceedings typically (although porhapo wrongly)
view the agencies they represent ac their client for purpoo of allocating docicion making, As a
reult, thcy havc a tendency to view thcir ethical responsibilities as csentially the same as those
held by lawyers for private clients. This view finds support in the professional literature."); Miller,
supra note 54, at 1296 ("In a system of checks and balances it is not the responsibility of an agency
attorney to represent the interests of Congress or the Court .... [Tihe constitutional system
presumes-indeed, depends upon-the institutional loyalty of its [agency] lawyers [to their
agencic]."); Rosenthal, supra note 209, at 17 (rejecting the view that "the role of the lawyer is to
interpret the statute and provide legal advice that best fulfills the public interest as eipresed in
such statutc," arguing that it is "implausible to characterize the enabling statute as the expression
of some collective, universally agreed-upon public interest"). But see Note, supra note 54, at 1185-
00 (rejecting an "agency loyalty approach to government lawycring" in favor of a "critical
approach").
284. Miller, supra note 54, at 1297.
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behavior.28 5) But she not only may but should assist an agency in
promulgating (and then litigating) actions based on an interpretation
that she, in the exercise of her professional judgment, thinks are
mistaken and/or expects eventually to be overturned, but which the
well-advised agency nevertheless has the institutional prerogative to
issue.286
A different question arises about agencies themselves. Given
that an agency is the person or body of persons who have the authority
to commit the government of the United States, 28 7 it is possible that the
ethical duties of those persons may depend on their professional status.
Nothing requires that an agency be a lawyer; often they are not.28 8 But
sometimes they are. Does an agency that is also a lawyer bear different
ethical responsibilities with respect to statutory interpretation?
The answer is no. It is impossible to see how an agency who is a
lawyer would have a more stringent obligation than a non-lawyer
agency. The latter already has the obligation to say what the law is
according to her best, public-minded judgment. This should apply
regardless of professional status. Similarly, a federal judge who is not
herself a lawyer has the same duties as her attorney colleagues with
respect to saying what the law is. 28 9
It is only slightly more challenging to reject the converse
possibility, that agencies who are attorneys should have the duties I
describe here, but that non-lawyer agencies should be entitled to more
freedom of action. In the context of stare decisis, for example, Professors
Nestor Davidson and Ethan Leib assert that "it would be reasonable to
ask whether nonlawyers who do not usually reason by case and
precedent do or should feel themselves bound by prior institutional
decisions."290 While the question may be reasonable with respect to a
transsubstantive issue like stare decisis, there is no reason
systematically to allow non-lawyer agencies more latitude with respect
to substantive legal interpretation than agencies who are lawyers. The
obligation to interpret the law flows from the role of the interpreter in
the governmental scheme, not her professional status.
285. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, §§ 96(2-3), 97(2) (2000).
286. Miller, supra note 54, at 1294, 1296-97.
287. See supra Part I.A.
288. See Rosenthal, supra note 209, at 18.
289. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT § 2.2 ("A judge shall uphold and apply the law.").
290. Davidson & Leib, supra note 15, at 273.
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CONCLUSION: REJECTING CYNICISM IN AGENCY PRACTICE
Any reader who has persevered this far might well wonder
whether so many pages are justified to argue for a principle that cannot
be policed or, in many cases, even observed. Well and good, my reader
might agree: The fact of judicial deference indeed does not invite
agencies to choose any interpretation that will merit such deference. By
making the agency the final authoritative interpreter, deference indeed
heightens the duty agencies bear to interpret statutes as best they can.
But nevertheless, in the real world, deference absolutely does invite
agencies to pick whatever interpretation, from among those that will
survive judicial review, that they like the best. By doing so, they get
what they want. Who would reject such an invitation-especially when
any gap that might exist between their stated preference and their
genuine view of the best interpretation will be invisible to all? To
imagine that agencies might feel themselves bound not to have what
they want betrays a hopeless romantic, and unrealistic, view of agency
practice.291
I do not deny that the entire argument I have presented is
predicated upon agencies being honest, at least with themselves if not
with the public, regarding what they think the "best" interpretation is.
Especially when choosing from among reasonable interpretations, it is
trivially easy to disguise such an opinion. One can allow one's statutory
judgment to be clouded by policy judgment, obfuscate, or just plain
conceal one's own real opinion about the best result.
Nevertheless: We do not and should not assume that those
authorized to say what the law is in the United States are dishonest or
even that they are obfuscatory. We should not even assume that they
allow themselves routinely to fall prey to self-deception. All of these
things are sometimes true, but they are not generally true. Exhibit A is
the judiciary. For all the evidence that judges are sometimes swayed by
policy, for all the suspicions that in this or that case a judicial opinion
describes reasons different from the true motivation for the result, for
all of the literature that suggests that courts deploy doctrines (like
Chevron) inconsistently, strategically, even arbitrarily--our legal
system operates in genuine faith that judges are impartial and
committed to the rule of law. We know that departures from this norm
are hard to detect, but we are not lying to ourselves when we doubt that
they are the norm. This may be romantic, but it is hardly unrealistic.
291. See Leib & Galoob, supra note 47, at 1820 & n.209.
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The project of this Article is to bring agencies entitled to judicial
deference under this umbrella. They, no less than courts, say what the
law is every day. They therefore, like courts, bear duties to interpret the
law as best they can. The courts and the public are entitled to expect,
and to behave as if, agencies can, will, and do rise to their
responsibilities.
